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ABSTRACT
In 1980, the railroad industry was deregulated due to poor industry 
performance as well as an ideological shift. The newly developed contestable 
market theory provided the political justification for deregulating what was 
previously perceived as a natural monopoly. The theme of this study is the 
examination of whether contestable market conditions exist in the U.S. surface 
transportation industry which are sufficient to justify giving up direct 
governmental involvement in the railroad industry. The main generic market 
structures that play an important role in the regulatory discussion are introduced 
and implications for regulatory intervention in the case of railroads are drawn.
The market structures examined are the perfect competition model, the natural 
monopoly, the contestable market theory and the cartel. Next, the history of 
railroad regulation and the changing position of railroads in the surface market is 
described. This history ranges from beginning of regulation in 1887 up to its 
abolishment in 1980. The outcomes of railroad deregulation regarding market 
concentration and operations are analyzed and key factors of railroad profitability 
are determined. Some consideration is given to the regulatory environment of 
other surface transportation modes, mainly the trucking industry, because the 
intermodal market is the relevant market for contestability. The intermodal 
transportation market which has grown rapidly since deregulation is described 
and analyzed. The present railroad market is segmented. The segments are
examined for their degree of contestability. Particular markets are introduced. 
E.g., the market extremes of transportation of wheat out of the Northern Plains 
and intermodal container traffic in the Ohio River Valley are examined for “fit” of 
the Contestable Market Theory. Open-access as a suitable alternative form of 
railroad regulation is discussed.
This study finds that no railroad market segment is contestable and hence 
that railroad deregulation based on contestable markets is not justified.
VPreface
Masters Theses at the College of Business Administration are few and far 
between; and they are usually encumbered with an air of mystique. A variety 
of people are involved, and all of these see the thesis in the context of their 
own goals: as a scientific investigation of a phenomenon, as a tool to teach 
certain skills, as an unavoidable must, as a vehicle of self-promotion, or as a 
gift of or to a university.
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this work has been conceived: Professor Donald N. Baum, as Chairman of 
the UNO CBA Graduate Program Council, and Professor Sufi Nazem and 
Professor Louis Pol, from the Department of Marketing, have affixed their 
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work can be attributed to Professor Michael J. O’Hara: my mentor, advisor 
and friend for our joint excursions into his favorite playground. Without his 
commitment and patience, bringing my endeavors to a successful conclusion 
would not have been possible.
But, nominally, the writing of a thesis constitutes only a fraction of the 
requirements for the acquisition of an MBA degree. I now believe that the real 
challenge of obtaining an MBA degree lies not simply in dealing with subject 
matters on an academic level or showing proficiency in particular fields; 
rather, the real task lies in mastering the administrative challenges involved. 
By far, the greatest credit in this field goes to my advisor Alexandra M. 
Kaczmarek. Without her inventiveness, diligence and inspiration, my 
graduation would simply not have been feasible.
The time is not ripe yet to judge on any long-term value of an UNO MBA 
degree. Particularly, whether it can provide some competitive advantage for 
managing business in America, in Europe, or in Asia. The following years 
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1CHAPTER I. 
INTRODUCTION
Railroads were heavily regulated from the late 19th century until the late 
20th century. During the era of regulation the transportation industry undergone 
significant changes. The emergence of the trucking industry introduced a mode 
able to complement and to some extent substitute for railroad service. The 
railroads were unable to respond to the new developments appropriately and 
were plunged into financial crisis.
During the 1970s, leading economists accused the prevalent regulatory 
system of hindering railroads from adapting their business properly to the new 
market environment. Deregulation was assumed to be a remedy to restore the 
financial health of railroads and to reduce government’s role in markets. In the 
late 1970s, the transportation market was totally different from what it had been 
80 years prior. Economists argued that the conditions that had ultimately led to 
regulation 80 years ago were no longer existent. More specifically, the 
availability of alternative modes of transportation was said to make most of the 
entire transportation market competitive.
2In the 1980 year Staggers Act, Congress explicitly recognized that "today, 
most transportation within the United States is competitive."1 Two assumptions 
set forth by economists provided justification for deregulation. First, regulation 
was assumed to hinder railroads in responding to their new market environment. 
Secondly, it was believed that a deregulated railroad industry would permit a 
competitive surface transportation industry even though railroads were natural 
monopolies.
The term "Contestable Market" was coined by Baumol in the late 1970s. 
At the same time, regulation of a number of industries was abolished along with 
a transition to a more lax antitrust enforcement policy. The gist of the railroad 
argument is that the surface transportation industry would exhibit characteristics 
of a "contestable market", a market form that allows competitive conditions in a 
monopolistic market environment.
The purpose of this study is to analyze the outcomes of deregulation of 
the railroad industry with respect to its goals and predicted outcomes. Special 
emphasis is given to the concept “contestability" as a justification for allowing 
monopolistic market structures. “Contestable markets” are examined to find the 
extent to which the deregulated railroad industry satisfies the criteria of a
1 Congressional Declaration of Findings set forth as an Historical Note to 49 U.S.C. 10101(a).
3contestable market. Also, alternative regulatory means are examined for 
suitability to increase competition in the deregulated railroad industry.
In Chapter II, the main generic market structures that play an important 
role in the regulatory discussion are introduced and implications for regulatory 
intervention in the case of railroads are drawn. These market structures are the 
perfect competition model, the natural monopoly, the contestable market theory, 
and the cartel. Issues like universal service to isolated shippers, price 
discrimination against shippers, internal cross-subsidizing, sunk-costs, and 
predatory pricing are analyzed in general.
In Chapter III, the history of railroad regulation and the changing position 
of railroads in the surface transportation market are described from the beginning 
of regulation in 1887 up to its abolishment in 1980.
Chapter IV begins with a brief overview of railroad specific terms. Next, 
the outcomes of railroad deregulation regarding market concentration and 
operations are analyzed and key factors of railroad profitability are determined. 
The chapter concludes with an overview of the trucking industry and the main 
provisions of the deregulation of the trucking industry, since trucking is often a 
close substitute for rail.
4In the first section of Chapter V, the intermodal transportation market, 
which has grown rapidly since deregulation, is described and analyzed. In 
section two, the present railroad market is segmented and the segments are 
examined for their degree of contestability and particular markets are introduced. 
Chapter V concludes with a discussion whether open-access as a suitable 
alternative form of railroad regulation. The findings of this study are presented in 
Chapter VI.
5CHAPTER II. 
ECONOMIC BACKGROUND
A. Perfect Competition
A perfectly competitive market satisfies the following criteria:2
1. Large number of small buyers and sellers,
2. All firms maximize profit,
3. Free and costless entry and exit,
4. Potential entrants face the same market demands as those available to 
incumbent firms. Products are homogenous, consequently there is no brand 
loyalty,
5. Potential entrants face the same productive techniques as those available to 
incumbent firms,
6. Equal access to input markets, especially equal access to factor prices, and
7. Perfect information.
If all of the features for perfect competition are present except the last 
one, then the market is described as purely competitive rather than perfectly 
competitive.3
2 Tisdell, 1982, p. 182. See also Dewy, 1975, p. 127. See also Shows, 1972, p. 279.
3 Shows, 1972, p. 281.
6In the following discussion the criteria for perfect competition are 
discussed briefly and some implications of the model will be highlighted.
The distinguishing feature of the perfect competition model is that the 
market consists of a large number of small (“atomistic”) buyers and sellers. Each 
firm is so small that no one can, acting alone, influence market price by varying 
output quantity, and no group of firms can form to act in concert to influence 
market price.
The production technique characteristic to the industry causes each firm’s 
average total costs to increase as output increases after passing through a 
minimum cost (see Figure 1 on page 7). Given the individual firm’s cost 
characteristics and assuming total industry demand exceeds individual firms’ 
efficient scale of production (Q’ »  q’), it is more efficient to allocate total industry 
production among a large number of firms with each firm producing at the 
minimum of average total costs.
7Market Firm
$
P'
0 Q' Q
$
m e =  s
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d =  mr
P1
q'0 q
s market supply
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P* equilibrium price
Q’ equilibrium quantity
d market demand faced by firm i
ate total average costs of firm i
me marginal cost of firm i
mr marginal revenue of firm i
s supply schedule of firm i
q’ output of firm i
Figure 1: The Demand And Supply Schedule For The Industry And The Individual Firm Under 
Perfect Competition.
Because no firm can influence market price by varying its output quantity, 
the individual firm faces a horizontal demand curve equal to the competitive 
industry’s equilibrium price. This implies that the market price P’ does not 
change over the firm’s entire output range. All firms are considered to be price- 
takers, maximizing their profit by selecting the quantity of output at which 
marginal revenue (mr) is equal to marginal cost (me). A horizontal demand curve 
yields marginal revenue equal to demand. Applying the profit maximization rule
8of (me = mr), and noting that mr = d = P’ means that the market yields a “price 
taker” which will produce where P’ = me.
Raising its price above the competitive level on the part of a single firm 
would simultaneously cause two effects. First, since the firm faces a horizontal 
demand curve, it would immediately lose all its customers. Second, attracted by 
excess economic profit, any entrepreneur would immediately enter the market 
and serve the former firm’s demand. Correspondingly, a price below the market 
equilibrium price (which is equal to average total costs) would cause an 
economic loss and make the firm leave the market in the long run. Equilibrium is 
reached when no firm desires to enter or leave the market. Hence, the condition 
for the equilibrium to be sustainable is that price equals each firm’s minimum 
average total costs in the long run.4 At this point each firm i in the industry 
produces an output of qV Summing up the individual firms’ output yields total 
industry supply
/
where n equals the number of firms in the industry. In sum, for the 
equilibrium under perfect competition the following conditions are effective:
4 tn the short run, the firm stays in the industry as long as the price is equal or above variable 
cost. To achieve allocative efficiency, the price taker firm produces only and always the output 
where price equals marginal cost.
9P’ = me = ate = mr = d.
That is, in the long run each firm earns zero economic profit but it can 
recover its full costs.5
1. Normative Implications of the Perfect Competition Model
The following implications can be inferred from the foregoing explanation:
1. In a perfect competitive industry each firm earns zero economic profit since 
market price equals each firm’s average total costs (P1 = ate) in the long run. 
On the other hand, each firm can recover its full costs in the long run. 
Therefore, under perfect competition neither firms nor consumers are favored 
at the other’s expense.
2. Under perfect competition, production in each individual firm and hence in the 
industry occurs where average total costs of production are minimal (see 
Figure 1 on page 7). Therefore, under perfect competition the industry
5 Economic profit also is defined as “rent”. It must be pointed out that economic profit does not 
equal profit in an accounting sense (accounting profit). Both accountants and economists 
calculate profit by subtracting costs from total revenue. However, costs are calculated differently. 
While accountants calculate costs solely on the basis of physical assets, depreciation and book 
value, economists add opportunity cost of the firm’s resources as an implicit cost. Therefore, at 
zero economic profit the firm earns an economist’s normal profit (which may require a profit in an 
accounting sense) sufficient to stay in the industry in the long run.
10
archives the definition of production efficiency.
3. Under perfect competition, production in each individual firm and hence in the 
industry occurs where price equals marginal cost of production. Some 
economists contend that marginal cost, besides measuring variations in actual 
production costs from the firm’s perspective, also measures opportunity costs 
of production from the point of view of society (social costs).6 Following that 
reasoning, an industry achieves allocative efficiency under perfect competition 
because market price equals society’s opportunity costs of production.
Because under perfect competition price would equal both private 
marginal cost and private average total costs, and private marginal cost would 
equal social marginal cost, economists often set perfect competition equal to 
Pareto Optimality if no externalities are present.7 A Pareto Optimum is the locus 
in a set of individual utility functions at which it is not possible to make somebody 
better off without making somebody else worse off. Therefore, under Pareto 
Optimality social welfare is said to be maximized. Both the definition of Pareto 
Optimality as an indicator for maximum social welfare and the identification of
6 Tisdell, 1982, p. 218-219. According to Tisdell, an industry’s marginal costs are equal to the 
costs society would incur if it would allocate that industry’s resources elsewhere in the most 
efficient way.
7 Dewey, 1975, p. 229.
11
Pareto Optimality with perfect competition have not been accepted 
unanimously.8
Nevertheless, it can be established with certainty that in a perfect 
competitive industry neither firms nor consumers are favored at the other’s 
expense because market price equals each firm’s average total costs. Hence, in 
a sense of equal welfare distribution, perfect competition is the preferable market 
form.
2. Limitations of the Perfect Competition Model: The Decreasing 
Cost Case
The model of perfect competition is based on the assumption that it is 
more efficient to allocate total industry production among a large number of 
equally sized firms. Fragmentation of the industry, in turn, makes each individual 
firm face a horizontal demand curve set at the industry’s equilibrium price. From 
the perspective of the individual firm, expansion is constrained in the face of 
increasing costs as output increases.
In contrast, Figure 2 on page 12 depicts the hypothetical case of a firm 
facing a horizontal demand curve but decreasing cost curves over the industry’s 
“entire range of output” such that firms cannot profit maximize at mr = me since
8 For detailed explanation, see Dewey, 1975, chapters 13 and 14.
12
at no output does mr = me. Instead, at any output above the cost covering 
output the firm’s profit continues to grow until the firm is the size of the industry.
Firm
$
d = mr
P'
ate
me
0 Q
Figure 2: The Firm Under “Perfect Competition” In A Decreasing Costs Industry.9
Recalling that product price is assumed to be fixed and all firms maximize 
profit, a perfectly competitive firm would expand to the end of the industry’s 
demand. The reason is that its marginal cost curve fails further and further 
below marginal revenue as its production increases, and so marginal profitability 
of expansion raises.10 In this case an equilibrium with a number of firms in the 
industry is not sustainable. This proves to be a contradiction to the basic
9 The course of the marginal cost function (MC) intentionally is not exactly specified because it is 
not crucial for the implications of the phenomenon depicted. However, it is certain that MC is 
below ATC over the entire range of output.
Proof: TC  =  F C +  V C * Q  and FC » V C  (fixed costs are relatively high -» in comparison 
variable costs are small and hence nearly constant over the entire range of output).
FC' f'C'
-► MC = i l£ -= v c  (1); ATC = — +VC (2); lim ATC = VC (3). >0 -►
3 Q  Q e-*« Q
ATC > MC where Q < oo.
13
assumption of the perfect competition model saying that there is a large number 
of small firms in the industry. Decreasing costs over a large scale of output 
constitute a phenomenon called “economics of scale”.11 The normative 
implication of this phenomenon is that in decreasing-cost industries perfect 
competition is not feasible. Rather, the industry is a natural monopoly.
B. The Natural Monopoly
An industry is said to be a natural monopoly if, over the entire relevant 
range of outputs, the firm’s cost function is strictly subadditive.12 In the single 
product case, subadditivity means that a firm can produce an output q to supply 
the entire market at a lower unit cost than k firms,
c(?)<ic(i,).
/ • = i
In the multiproduct case subadditivity is defined in the same way, meaning 
that a single firm can produce a set of outputs at a lower unit cost than two or 
more firms,
10 Tisdell, 1982, p. 221.
14
co>+yj<coo + coo.
For the single product case, economics o f size are sufficient for 
subadditivity. Railroads have been a typical example for a natural monopoly 
(i.e., investment in infrastructure and rolling stock requires high expenses which 
constitute high fixed operating cost whereas variable operating costs are 
comparatively low).
In the multiproduct case, size economics are not sufficient for 
subadditivity.13 In a multiple output market, subadditivity holds only if there are 
economics o f jo in t production.'4 Tests of economics of joint production are cost 
complementarity or trans-ray convexity of the cost function, which are both 
sufficient for subadditivity by themselves.15
1. Normative Implications of the Natural Monopoly
11 Large scale of production (“economics of scale”) is one of other causes of cost advantages due 
to large size of the firm. Therefore, in the following the term “economics of size” is used instead of 
“economics of scale”.
12 Sharky, 1982, Chapter 4.
13 Sharky, 1982, p. 62.
14 Also denoted “economics of scope”.
15 Cost complementarity holds if an increase in the quantity of one output reduces the incremental 
cost of producing other outputs. A two-product cost function C is trans-ray convex at a quantity of 
output y, if there is a line through y with a negative slope such that C is convex along the segment 
of hat line bounded by the output coordinate axes.
15
First, it must be that in the presence of size economics, society appears to 
be better off when the entire market is served by one single firm. This is the 
ideal way for society to achieve allocative and production efficiency to maximize 
social welfare.
On the other hand, a market served by one firm lacks the “invisible hand” 
mechanisms that lead to allocative and production efficiency. Under perfect 
competition no firm can, acting alone, influence market price. If a firm raises its 
price it will be rejected by the market. However, if the entire market is served by 
one monopolist, the monopolist possesses market power. That is, the 
monopolist can influence the market price by varying its output quantity.
Because of this a monopolist is also classified as a price-searcher, instead of a 
price-taker.
16
$
E
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Figure 3: The Natural Monopoly.16
Like any firm, the monopolist produces a quantity where MR = MC (at 
point H) in order to maximize his profit. In Figure 3 on page 16 this yields an 
output quantity of Q1 and a price of p1.
Different from a firm under perfect competition (Figure 1 on page 16), a 
natural monopoly does not face increasing average total costs beyond some 
quantity of output. Therefore, ATC and MC do not intersect at any point (which 
would be the firm’s point of production under perfect competition). In the case of 
a natural monopoly, marginal cost pricing (as the case under perfect competition)
16 For the marginal cost curve, see Footnote 9 on page 12.
17
would yield a point of production at point J, output would be Q2, market price 
would be p2, and consumer surplus were p2JEp2. However, it can be seen that 
at point J the monopolist would suffer a loss since at Q2 the ATC > p2. This loss 
is equal to p2JGp3p2. The monopolist would have no incentive to produce in the 
long run unless he would be allowed to engage in price discrimination against 
consumers.17
The monopolist restraints output to Q1 so that he earns a rent equal to 
BCAplB, and consumers suffer a loss equal to p3FAp1p3 which exceeds the 
monopolist’s rent by far. Consumers retain the surplus p1 AEp1. Society suffers 
a net loss (so called Kaldor-Hicks loss18) equal to p3FACBp3.
Producing at the cost covering point F would yield a market price p3 and 
an output quantity of Q3, which is less than the output Q2 under marginal cost 
pricing but much higher than the output Q1 at the monopolist’s profit maximizing 
point. At point F, the monopolist would earn an accounting profit but no 
economic profit; At the cost covering point F the monopolist would earn an 
accounting profit but no economic profit; while consumers would suffer a loss 
compared to marginal cost pricing equal to p2JFp3p2. Since p2JFp3p2 <
17 In the short run a firm may produce where p < ATC as long as p > AFC. If fixed costs are sunk 
costs (which is the case for a main share of fixed cost in the railroad industry), in the short run a 
firm may even produce where p < AFC. This constitutes the basis for predatory pricing.
18 Tisdell, 1982, p. 214.
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p2JGp3p2 (the monopolist’s loss under marginal cost production), the optimal 
point of production would be point F since society’s loss is minimal at this point.
The following statements can be inferred from the above observation:
■ The distinguishing feature of the natural monopoly is relatively high fixed cost 
that need to be recovered. Therefore, it is socially desirable that the entire 
market is served by only one firm to capitalize on size economics.
■ The monopolist will, if unregulated, exert market power, select the output 
where MR = MC and earn a rent at the expense of consumer and social 
welfare.
■ Marginal cost pricing is not feasible under natural monopoly since no 
production would occur.
■ The socially optimal point of production under a natural monopoly occurs 
where P = ATC. Therefore, regulatory policy should set a price ceiling at 
average total costs.
In the case of the railroads a striking issue is the issue of universal 
service™ That is, it is socially desirable that even remote rural areas are served 
by the railroads. However, assuming there was only one railroad serving the 
market, it would be inclined to reduce its output quantity, raise its prices and earn 
a rent. The railroad would operate only main tracks with high traffic density 
where it can predictably recover its fixed cost. Low density tracks in remote 
areas would tend to be abandoned. Figure 3 on page 16 provides the theoretical
19 Knieps, 1988, p. 21.
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proof for that behavior. It shows that in the absence of regulation, a monopolist 
would reduce his output to Q1 and raise the price to p1. A monopolistic railroad 
may be willing to serve low density lines at higher rates which would constitute a 
case of price discrimination against remote shippers.20 A monopolist might also 
employ price discrimination against markets if it serves some areas where it 
faces competition and others where no competition exists. In that case, the 
railroad would charge rates above average total costs in markets where it 
possesses monopoly power. A monopolist may use price discriminatory 
behavior called cross-subsidizing. Monopoly power in one market would allow 
the railroad to charge rates below average total costs in a different market where 
it faces competition, and hence to achieve a competitive advantage.
Investments in infrastructure do not only constitute high fixed cost but also 
constitute sunk cost because investments in infrastructure cannot be recovered 
at a future date. Sunk costs have considerable influence in the strategic conduct 
of firms depending on whether the firm is an insider or a potential entrant. 
Potential entrants perceive sunk costs as a barrier to entry because commitment 
in sunk assets bears the risk of considerable loss. Insiders who already have
20 In terms of law, price discrimination is constituted where pA *  pB for the same commodity ascent 
prior knowledge of cost differentials equal to the price differentials. In the U.S., price 
discrimination is illegal under section 2 of the Clayton Act, better known as Robinson-Patman Act
(15 U.S.C. § 13). In economic terms, price discrimination is constituted where P a ^  Pb
m ca m cb
(Dewey, 1975, p. 48). Hence, charging higher rates for railroad service in remote areas with lower
20
incurred sunk cost perceive sunk assets as not relevant for pricing decisions 
since there is no opportunity to employ those elsewhere. Hence, insiders will 
stay in the industry as long as revenue covers at least variable cost. If two or 
more railroads compete directly with each other, each of them might 
independently fix its prices equal to variable cost in order to attract demand. 
However, since revenues do not cover total costs, the firm suffers an economic 
loss which prevents the firm from maintaining and replacing its assets in the long 
run. If persistent, then this phenomenon is denoted destructive competition.21 If 
a firm independently sets its prices below its own average total costs and below 
the competitor’s variable cost in order to force a competitor out of business, this 
behavior is denoted predatory pricing.22
Put together, there are three main structural reasons to regulate railroads:
1. A natural monopoly might abuse its market power (i.e., earn a rent, practice 
price discrimination, refuse to contract).
Regulatory protection against a monopolist’s abuse of market power can 
be attempted by regulatory establishment of a maximum rate the railroad may
traffic density constitutes a case of price discrimination in a law sense but not necessarily in an 
economic sense.
21 Knieps, 1988, p. 48.
22 Shughard, 1990, p. 295. See also Footnote 17 on page 17.
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charge (rate ceiling), setting a maximum rate of return the railroad is allowed to 
earn (rate of return regulation), prohibiting price discrimination and control 
mergers.
2. To provide universal service (“common-carrier obligation”).
To guarantee universal service, regulatory authorities may confer a 
general obligation to contract upon the railroads. This includes control of track 
abandonments, that is, exit. The regulator takes over the market function of 
controlling entry and exit.
3. To avoid destructive competition and predatory pricing.
Destructive competition and predatory pricing can be avoided by 
establishing a minimum price railroads may charge. This price must not be lower 
than average total costs. Regulation of entry and exit is another means to avoid 
destructive competition and predatory pricing.
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C. The Contestable Market Theory
The contestable market theory is a relatively new theory of industry 
structure. It was finally formalized in 1982 after more than ten years of 
preliminary preparations. The theory is a generalization of the model of perfect 
competition insofar as it allows an oligopoly or even a monopoly instead of 
atomistic competition to maximize social welfare. The theory states that, even 
under a monopoly, production can occur at a socially optimal point because the 
threat of potential entry can encourage the monopolist to refrain from producing 
inefficiently or earning a rent.
A perfectly contestable market satisfies the following criteria:23
1. Economics of size or scope may be present, accordingly there may be an 
oligopoly or even a monopoly in the market.
2. All firms maximize profit.
3. Free and costless entry and exit. Firms enter the market whenever entry is 
profitable.24 Only sunk costs are regarded to be a barrier to entry and exit.25 
Consequently, no sunk costs are incurred upon entry.
4. Potential entrants face the same market demands as those available to 
incumbent firms. Products are homogenous, consequently there is no brand 
loyalty.
23 Baumol, 1988, p. xiii; also Baumol, 1994, p. 42.
24 Baumol, 1988, p. 5.
25 Baumol, 1994, pp. 42-43.
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5. Potential entrants face the same productive techniques as those available to 
incumbent firms.
6. Equal access to input markets, especially equal access to factor prices.
7. Perfect Information.
Entry becomes attractive for potential entrants whenever an incumbent 
earns a rent. Potential entrants assume that the incumbent’s prices are 
sustainable which means that the incumbent does not match the entrant’s price 
immediately upon entry26 (this is the so-called Bertrand-Nash Conjecture27). 
Therefore, entrants can expect to distract incumbent’s business. When the 
incumbent matches the price, the entrant will leave the market. Exit is assumed 
to be costless. Per definition, no sunk costs have been incurred so all 
investments can be recovered fully. A temporary economic profit remains with 
the entrant. Therefore, entrants can pursue a hit-and-run-strategy.
The central statement of the contestable market theory is that the threat of 
potential entry makes the monopolist allocate resources and produce efficiently. 
In other words, Pareto Optimality is achieved.28 Pareto optimality is a necessary 
condition for the monopoly or oligopoly to be sustainable, and sustainability is a
necessary condition for equilibrium:29
/
26 Baumol, 1988, p. 11.
27 Knieps, 1988, p. 45.
28 Baumol, 1994, p. 44. See Baumol, 1982 p. 4.
29 Baumol, 1988, p. 11.
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“To achieve sustainability, even a natural monopolist must operate in 
an efficient manner and must earn no more than a normal rate of 
return on its capital investments. That is, in contestable markets a 
monopoly firm can only earn zero profits and must operate 
efficiently.”30
In the early 1980s, when the theory had evolved, its authors claimed that 
many industries were contestable, especially long distance telephony and the 
airline industry.31 Contestability had been proposed as a general guide for 
regulation.32 The phrase that has often been cited is that airplanes represent 
“capital on wings”33 that is perfectly mobile. By now these assumptions have 
proved to be misguided. Critics of the theory point out that the assumptions the
theory is based on are highly restrictive and that the deductive results would hold
/
only when these pure conditions exist.34 Therefore contestability was far away 
from reality.
The most restrictive assumption of the Contestable Market Theory is that 
it regards only sunk costs as barriers to entry and exit.35 However, in reality,
30 Baumol, 1988, p. 6.
31 Baumol, 1988, p. 489. See also Bailey, 1981.
32 Baumol, 1988, p. 466.
33 Baumol, 1988, p. 500.
34 Shepherd, 1995.
35 Baumol, 1994, p. 43.
25
there are many different barriers to entry and exit, such as legal barriers, 
switching costs, customer loyalty, experience curves, diseconomies of size, 
artificial barriers to entry erected by incumbents and so on. These barriers can 
lessen or even eliminate the threat of entry even if entry involves no sunk costs.
Schwartz points out that the Bertrand-Nash Conjecture does not hold in 
practice but that in practice incumbents change price rapidly in response to entry 
which offsets the ease of entry and makes markets noncontestable in the sense 
that pricing behavior becomes unaffected by the treat of entry.36
By 1994 Baumol came to the conclusion that “a perfect contestable 
market is a fictional ideal, no more to be found in reality than a market that is 
perfectly competitive. But [...] the object of using this concept is to give 
regulators a model for the design of rules for markets that are distinctly not 
contestable.”37
1. Implications of the Contestable Market Theory
Despite the criticism the oontestable market theory has been confronted 
with in terms of its practical applicability it renders some insights for regulation:
36 Schwartz, 1986, p. 55.
37 Baumol, 1994, p. 43.
26
1. Fixed cost versus sunk costs.
A natural monopoly (size economics through high fixed cost) does not 
constitute a barrier to entry per se but fixed costs must be sunk costs at the 
same time.38 As long as fixed cost can be recovered potential competition is 
more likely to keep the industry competitive.
2. Barriers to entry.
Since barriers to entry are the main impediment to perfect contestability, 
regulatory policy should concentrate on the abolishment of barriers to entry.
3. New definition o f the relevant market
The idea of the “potential entry” opens up the view of the market. That is, 
“substitutes” expand to include potential entrants that can compete with the 
incumbent despite the fact that they might currently belong to a different industry. 
The relevant market becomes broader. This insight has practical relevance for 
the regulation of railroads. It is obvious that the railroad industry will never 
satisfy the criteria for contestability, if for no other reason than the high sunk 
costs involved. However, other freight transportation industries, like the trucking 
or the barge industry, can be considered as equivalent substitutes to the
38 Knieps p. 46.
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railroads in some contexts. This means that the railroads sometimes directly 
compete with other surface freight carriers.
4. Pricing rule for the natural monopoly.
Potential competition via substitutes sets new standards for defining price 
ceilings for natural monopolies. It has been shown that under a natural 
monopoly the rule price equal to marginal cost may not be feasible because of 
losses the monopolist would incur. This is because of the high fixed cost which 
does not affect marginal cost at all. The general problem a monopolist faces is 
that he must charge a markup on marginal cost to recover his fixed cost. The 
difficulty has always been how to determine the markup.
A well known method to determine the markup on marginal cost is 
Ramsey pricing.39 The premises for Ramsey pricing is that the monopolist earns 
no rent and that social welfare is maximized. According to the Ramsey price 
rule, a monopolistic firm perfectly price discriminates by charging a markup on 
products in inverse proportion to demand elasticity. But, in the case of railroads, 
Ramsey pricing does not conform with the provision of universal service and fair 
rates. In rural areas that are served by only one railroad, demand elasticity will 
be lower (i.e., fewer choices) than elsewhere so the railroads will charge higher
39 Ramsey, 1927, p. 41.
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rates in rural areas. Therefore, Ramsey pricing is an inadequate means for 
setting railroad rates and rate ceilings, respectively.
In 1981, The ICC40 adopted the concept of stand-alone costs for 
determining rate ceilings for railroads. As acknowledged by the ICC, the concept 
of stand-alone costs (SAC) was derived from the contestable market theory. “A 
rate level calculated by the SAC methodology represents the theoretical 
maximum rate a railroad could levy on shippers without substantial diversion of 
traffic to a hypothetical competing service.”41 The hypothetical competing service 
is assumed to earn no rent, hence stand-alone costs are equal to its long run 
average total costs. Thus, the concept of stand-alone costs is based on two 
principles. First, it is based on the principle of potential entry because stand­
alone costs are equal to the price an entrant would charge. Second, stand-alone 
costs have the character of opportunity costs because shippers are charged 
rates they would have to pay for the second favorable alternative. However, 
stand-alone costs do not constitute opportunity costs of production from the point 
of view of society as marginal cost do. Consequently, stand-alone costs do not 
maximize social welfare but rather minimize shippers’ losses. In addition, it 
might be hard to determine the long run average total costs of a hypothetical 
competing service in practice.
40 Interstate Commerce Commission, the regulatory authority over U.S. surface transportation, 
established in 1887 under the Interstate Commerce Act, abolished in 1995.
41 Baumol, 1988, p. 507.
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D. The Cartel
A cartel is created when several firms explicitly agree to act in concert by 
jointly limiting the quantity of output they produce and jointly setting an uniform 
price.42 Railroads’ former practice of collective ratemaking is a form of cartel.43 
The effects of a cartel on the market are the same as under monopoly: reduced 
output quantity, higher price, and increased joint profits of the participants. In the 
U.S., cartels are illegal under the Sherman Act44 for purposes of domestic trade. 
Figure 4 on page 29 depicts the basic mechanism of the cartel in the case of two 
participating firms.
Firm A Firm B Cartel
MC<
atc<
MR
0 qa q a q o qb q'b q o Q c  Q 'c  Q
Figure 4: Cartel Production
42 Shows, pp. 388-391. For an analytical approach See, Stiegler, 1964.
43 Popper, 1996, p. 26.
44 The Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. §1) declares illegal existing conspiracies and combinations in 
restraint to trade and disproportionately to the firms legal business interests (section 1) and 
attempts to create them (section 2).
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Assuming a market demand D, the cartel maximizes joint profits by setting 
joint output quantity (Qc) where joint marginal cost (MCc = mca + mcb) is equal to 
marginal revenue (MCc = MR). This yields a uniform price pc. Output is allocated 
across participating firms in a way that yields maximum efficiency. That is, 
production in each individual firm i occurs where mq = MR, which yields outputs 
of qa and qb respectively (where qa + qb = Qc) ar|d joint profits
n c = [p c -a tc a{qa)\q a + [p c -a tc b(qb)\q b .
However, a cartel is not stable. Provided the uniform price pc is sustained, 
each individual firm has an incentive to expand production to q’a and q’b 
respectively in order to maximize its own profit (i.e., pc = mCj = mrj). But this 
behavior would yield a joint output Q’c which would cause market price to fall and 
to make the cartel worse off than before. Therefore, to ensure the stability of the 
cartel, output quantity must be strictly controlled by the participating firms, each 
of which has the incentive to cheat the others.
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CHAPTER III.
FEDERAL REGULATION AND DEREGULATION IN 
THE U.S. SURFACE TRANSPORTATION
INDUSTRY
A. From the Interstate Commerce Act in 1887 to the Motor 
Carrier Act in 1935
During the second half of the 19th century the extension of the U.S. 
railroads had been heavily pushed ahead since the railroads had a crucial role in 
the opening up the west.45 The railroads were the first large firms in the U.S. As 
natural monopolies, the railroad industry exhibited some of the undesirable 
consequences of monopolies: namely price discrimination and destructive 
competition. The former constituted a rationale for regulation on the part of 
shippers and government, the latter constituted a rationale for regulation on the 
part of the railroads themselves in order to end price wars and to stabilize rates.46
With the passage of the Interstate Commerce Act in 1887 the railroads 
were regulated at federal level.47 The Interstate Commerce Act also established
45 Wood, 1990, p. 116.
46 Friedlaender, 1969, p. 2.
47 Winston, 1990, p. 7.
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the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), the federal regulatory agency that 
subsequently became responsible for regulation of all other modes of surface 
transportation. In detail, the Interstate Commerce Act contained the following 
major sections:48
1. All rates were to be “just and reasonable.” Unjust and unreasonable rates 
were prohibited and declared unlawful.
2. Preferential treatment of individuals by special rates, rebates, drawbacks or 
other devices was declared “unjust discrimination” and made unlawful.
3. Undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any person, company, 
firm, area or type of traffic was declared unlawful.
4. It was made illegal to charge more for a short haul than for a longer one, 
exemptions were feasible in the presence of competition.49
5. Pooling of traffic or earnings was prohibited.
6. Railroads were required to publish rates. Increases requires ten days notice.
7. Railroads were prohibited from breaking continuous movements of freight in 
order to circumvent the act.
8. Carriers were to be liable for damages for violation of the Act.
The Act did not address a prevalent form of price discrimination used by 
the railroads, the practice of “value-of-service-pricing” (also denoted as “ad 
valorem pricing”). Under value-of-service-pricing, freight rates were proportional 
to the value of the commodity carried which meant low rates for agricultural
48 Noll, 1983, p. 117.
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products and high rates for manufactured goods. Value-of-service-pricing is a 
rough approximation of Ramsey price discrimination based on elasticity. This 
rate structure was beneficial for all parties involved. Railroads could recover 
their fixed cost, farmers and homesteaders had an incentive to settle the western 
lands and emerging western industries were protected from eastern 
competition.50 In its first annual report the ICC expressly approved of the 
practice of value-of-service-pricing.51
The Hepburn Act of 1906 gave the ICC jurisdiction over maximum rates. 
The Transportation Act of 1920 gave the ICC authority to regulate minimum 
rates/entry, exit, capital formation, and mergers. At that time the railroads were 
still the main carrier in the US. In 1948 the ICC was empowered by the Reed 
Bulwinkle Act to exempt collective rate making by railroads from prosecution 
under the Sherman Act.52 Then, railroads entirely set their rates lawfully, in a 
cartel fashion, and collectively through rate bureaus.53
49 This shows the difference between law price discrimination and economic price discrimination. 
See, Footnote 20 on page 19.
50 Friedlaender, 1981, p. 106.
51 ICC, 1887, p. 36. In: Friedlaender, 1981, p. 106.
52 Noll, p. 118. Collective rate making is like price fixing under cartel and hence was viewed as a 
combination in restraint to trade. Congressional action clarified the legitimacy of this collective 
action. See also Footnote 44 on page 29.
53 Rate bureaus are committees formed by common carriers to set rates. See Wood, 1990, p. 
525.
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B. Emergence of Competing Modes
In the 1920s the trucking industry began to grow rapidly. Entry into the 
trucking industry was easy because entrants incurred - in comparison to 
railroads - minimal sunk costs. Technological advances such as development of 
the pneumatic tire and the gasoline engine, assembly line production and the 
construction of paved roads facilitated transportation of goods by truck and 
pushed truck rates down. Moreover, especially in the transportation of high 
value manufactured goods, trucks had two distinct advantages over railroads: 
First, the value-of-service pricing standard made rail rates on manufactured 
goods artificially high. Second, transportation by rails bore a high risk of damage 
due to slack action of cars in hump yards.54 Interstate trucking threatened to 
disrupt the railroads’ cartel by undercutting rates. Not surprisingly, the railroads 
were the first advocates of federal regulation of interstate trucking arguing that 
the limitation of entry into the trucking industry and regulated rates would restore 
“order” in the transportation industry.55 That is, the railroads’ price cartel could be 
stabilized. Later entry regulation was also supported by the trucking industry that 
speculated entry regulation would benefit firms already in the industry.
54 GAO, 1993, p. 15.
55 Noll, 1983, p. 119.
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In 1935 Congress passed the Motor Carrier Act that expanded the ICC’s 
regulatory authority over interstate trucking.56 Regulation was imposed in three 
areas: (1) entry (prospective entrants had to prove that additional service was 
needed), (2) rates, and (3) securities, acquisitions, and related financial 
transactions and agreements.57 Motor carriers were divided up into three types, 
common, contract and private carriers.58 Private carriers and carriers of 
agricultural commodities were granted exempt carrier status and they were not 
subject to ICC regulation.59 Railroads were not allowed to acquire trucking firms 
unless the transaction would promote the public interest and the trucking service 
would be used to public advantage and would not unduly restrain competition.”60
56 The Emergency Railroad Transportation Act of 1933 created the office of Federal Coordinator 
of Transportation whose duty was to make a study of means for “improving conditions 
surrounding transportation in all its forms and the preparation of plans therefore” (Emergency 
Railroad Transportation Act, 1933, chap. 91, 48 Stat. 211). Joseph B. Eastman, an ICC 
commissioner, was named coordinator. His report was submitted to senate on March 10th, 1934. 
It included a draft bill which became the basis for the Motor Carrier Act of 1935. The rationale for 
limiting entry into the motor carrier industry was that virtually all other attempts to regulate motor 
carrier transportation by the states and by foreign nation included such provisions (See, Noll, pp. 
119-121).
57 Friedlaender, 1969, p. 111.
58 For an explanation see, Classification by Type of Contract on page 93.
59 Wood, 1990, p. 38.
^49 U.S.C. 11344 (c). This provision was originally contained in Section 213 (a) (1) of the Motor 
Carrier Act of 1935 (Public Law 74-498).
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Large number of small buyers 
and sellers
In 1929, there were 3.5 million trucks in the US.61 In 1935, 
after the passage of the MCA, 900,000 trucking firms 
applied for “grandfather rights”.62
All firms maximize profit It can be assumed with complete certainty that all firms in 
the industry practice profit maximization.
Free and costless entry and exit A trucking business can be run as a sole proprietorship.
The only main asset that is required is the truck itself. A 
truck is not fixed to a certain route and can be sold off at 
present market value at any time. There are potential but no 
implicit economics of size in the trucking industry.63 
Therefore, entry and exit are free and costless.
Potential entrants face the same 
market demands as those 
available to incumbent firms. 
Products are homogenous, 
consequently there is no brand 
loyalty
The trucking industry is fragmented, consequently both 
firms and entrants face a small, qualitatively identical equal 
share of demand. Asymmetry in service can be eliminated 
easily
Potential entrants face the same 
productive techniques as those 
available to incumbent firms
In the trucking industry, the basic productive technique is 
the truck. Trucks are mass products, therefore entrants face 
the same productive techniques as those available to 
incumbent firms.
Equal access to input markets, 
especially equal access to factor 
prices
Input factors in the trucking industry are fuel, spare parts, 
stationary and telephone service. All are mass products. 
Therefore, both firms and entrants have equal access to 
input markets and factor prices.
Table I: Application Of The Model Of Perfect Competition In The Trucking Industry.
61 Dempsey, 1989, p. 16.
62 Friedlaender, 1969, p. 112. Motor carrier businesses that had existed before the passage of 
the Motor Carrier Act (MCA) were allowed to continue operations under “grandfather rights”. 
Accordingly, there were at least 900,000 trucking firms in the U.S. in 1935.
63 In the railroad industry there are intrinsic economics of size due to the physical structure of the 
industry (decreasing cost industry). In the trucking industry it needs to be distinguished between 
TL and LTL sector. See The Motor Carrier Act of 1980 on page 95. In 1935 there were quite less 
size economics in the trucking industry than nowadays. By 1967 Nelson (Nelson, 1967, p. 323) 
states that there are no size economics in the trucking industry. By 1986, Glaskowsky 
(Glaskowsky, 1986, p. 9, p. 65) acknowledges distinct economics of size in the LTL sector. For a 
quantitative analysis of economics of size in the common carriers of general commodities see 
Friedlaender, 1980, p. 173.
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At this time it is worthwhile to consider whether the structure of the 
trucking industry justifies regulation in principle. In the following it is examined to 
what extend the trucking industry can be regarded purely competitive. In Table I 
on page 36 all criteria that make up pure competition are evaluated for the 
trucking industry.
Table I on page 36 shows that the trucking industry is structurally purely 
competitive. This implies that the trucking industry, left to the “invisible hand 
forces” of the free market, would adjust in an equilibrium where both firms and 
consumers enjoy equal shares of welfare. In that sense, social welfare is 
maximized. Consequently, in the face of welfare consideration no regulation is 
necessary. This result proves that the regulation of the interstate trucking 
industry in 1935 has not been established on grounds of welfare or allocative 
considerations. Given the situation of railroads and existing trucking firms at that 
time suggests that railroads and incumbent trucking companies have exerted 
their influence in establishing regulation of the trucking industry for their own 
benefit. Further, the Transportation Act of 1935 backed up the ICC’s desire to 
keep freight rates low on shipments of large-volume, low-value agricultural 
products, presuming these low rates preserved the railroads’ value-of-service 
rate structure.64
64 For detailed explanations see Kahn, 1971, p. 14.
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Although the trucking industry is the most direct competitor of the railroad 
industry, there are other modes of transportation that can be at least partly 
regarded as competing modes to the railroad industry. These are the barge 
industry, the pipeline industry, and the airline industry. Concerning passenger 
traffic, the intercity bus industry and the airline industry can be regarded as 
competing modes. Since this study confines itself to freight traffic, passenger 
traffic is left out of further consideration. All of these industries have been 
regulated and then deregulated later. Table II on page 39 provides an overview 
of the area of regulation with respect to different transportation modes that are 
potentially suitable to compete with railroads. Because these modes are partly 
suitable to compete with railroads for shipments, they must be included in 
considerations about the relevant market of railroads.
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Railroads 1887 Interstate 
Commerce Act
ICC
STB (since 1996)65
1980 Staggers 
Rail Act66
Interstate
Trucking
1935
Motor Carrier Act
ICC
STB (since 1996)
1980 Motor 
Carrier Act67
Natural Gas 
Pipelines
1938 FPC68
FERC (since 1977)69
Oil Pipelines 1906
Hepburn Act70
ICC
FERC (since 1977)
Airlines 1938 Civil 
Aeronautics Act
CAB71 1978 Airline De­
regulation Act
Inland Water 
Carriers (“barges”)
1940 Transportation 
Act72
ICC
STB (since 1996)
Table II: Regulation And Deregulation Of Transportation Modes.
65 The ICC had been abolished by 12/31/95. Most of its remaining authority has been transferred 
to the Surface Transportation Board (STB), an independent body attached to the U.S. Department 
of Transportation (DOT). See, Omaha Word Herald, 11/22/95.
66 Under the Staggers Act the railroad industry was not fully deregulated, although the Staggers 
Act is regarded as the threshold towards deregulation.
67 Under the Motor Carrier Act of 1980 interstate trucking was not fully deregulated, although the 
Motor Carrier Act of 1980 is regarded as the threshold towards deregulation.
68 Federal Power Commission (FPC). See, Wood, 1990, p. 147.
69 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), an independent body created by the new U.S. 
Department of Energy (DOE) in 1977. See, Wood, 1990, p. 146.
70 Wood, 1990, p. 37.
71 Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB).
72 Friedlaender, 1969, p. 22.
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C. Movement towards Deregulation
After 1935, two developments favored the trucking industry rather than the 
railroads. First, the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1956 immensely pushed ahead 
the improvement of the interstate-high way system. It created the Highway Trust 
Fund which received its funds exclusively from highway-use taxes. Its goal was 
to construct a sophisticated 40,000 mile long highway system throughout the 
U.S.73 Second, as a result of industrial growth, high-value manufactured goods 
accounted for an increasing share of the total amount of goods carried. The 
establishment of manufacturing industries in suburban areas where no railroad 
terminals were available also favored trucking service.74
Figure 5 on page 41 and Figure 6 on page 42 depict the volume 
distribution of intercity freight traffic with respect to modes for the period from 
1939 to 1995. It is clearly visible that particularly the trucking industry diverted 
traffic away from the railroads. Kahn blames the ICC ratemaking for the 
diversion of traffic.75 Although rail and truck rates were set commonly, it was 
feasible to circumvent ICC regulation through the (truck) exempt carrier status. 
Exempt carriers invaded the common carrier market by leasing out their trucks at 
cut-rates to common carriers for the return trip or by fictionally purchasing the
73 Wood, 1990, p. 94.
74 Meyer, 1974, p. 142.
75 Kahn, 1971, p. 19.
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goods for the period of transit. Not bound by rates set by the ICC, exempt 
carriers were free to quote whatever charges they pleased and to undercut 
railroad rates that were set by the ICC. In 1964, about two-thirds of intercity 
truck ton-miles were handled by exempt motor carriers.76
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Figure 5: Estimated Volume Distribution Of Intercity Freight Traffic, Public And Private, In Ton- 
Miles,77 By Modes Of Transport, 1939 - 1995.78
76 Kahn, 197.1, p. 21. According to the 1963 Census of Transportation, in 1963 42,986 of the 
57,800 motor carriers in the U.S. in that year were exempt carriers.
77 For explanation see Weight/Distance on page 55.
78 Data from Moody, 1996, p. a5.
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Percentage Distribution of Intercity Freight Traffic Volume
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Figure 6: Estimated Volume Distribution Of Intercity Freight Traffic, Public And Private, As 
Percentage Of Total Ton-Miles Carried, By Modes Of Transport, 1939 - 1995.79
In addition to drawbacks due to structural changes and regulation itself, 
inflexible labor contracts put a heavy cost burden on the railroads.80 The oil 
crises in the early 1970s made the main input factor of railroads more expensive 
and slowed demand for railroad service down. On the other hand, the ICC 
approved proposed abandonments of unprofitable lines only with reluctance to 
maintain the railroads’ common-carrier obligation.
79 Data from Moody, 1996, p. a5.
80 Keeler, 1983, p. 50.
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Economists point out that regulation may in fact stipulate costs that may 
outweigh the social gains of regulation. Regulation may impose costs on society 
(1) in the form of administrative costs and (2) in the form of opportunity costs 
caused by resource misallocation (as a result of rate of return regulation and ad 
valorem pricing81) and creation of excess capacity (as a result of the common- 
carrier obligation82) on part of producers and distortion o f demand. Regulation 
was also said to stifle innovation. Different econometric studies on the effects of 
regulation have been conducted. In the view of social losses incurred through 
regulation many of them argue for deregulation.83
Excess capacity was seen as prevalent impediment to efficiency. Mergers 
have traditionally been regarded as potential remedy. In 1920, Congress 
directed the ICC to conduct a study to consolidate the railroads into 18 to 20 
railroads.84 Congress adopted the plan in 1929 but it was never realized. In the 
early 1960s the argument for merger was that railroads operating at efficient size 
were able to apply a rate system which was more closely based on costs (in 
contrast to the prevalent value-of-service pricing system) which in turn would
81 Denoted Averch-Johnson Effect, See, Averch, 1962.
82 For an econometric model see Levin, 1981. Levin finds that excess capacity (low density lines) 
is a primary source of the unprofitability of the U.S. railroad industry.
83 For a full discussion of the economical consequences of regulation, see Friedlaender, 1969, 
Chapter 4 (includes references). See also Peck, Merton J.: Competitive Policy for Transportation; 
in: John R. Meyer and others: The Economics of Competition in the Transportation Industries, 
Chaps. 6 and 7; Harvard University Press; Cambridge, MA, 1959. Also see: Boyer, Kenneth D.: 
The Costs of Price Regulation: Lessons from Railroad Deregulation; Rand Journal of Economics; 
Vol. 18, pp. 408-416, Autumn 1987.
84 Friedlaender, 1969, p. 138.
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increase economic efficiency in the transport sector. Friedlaender identifies side- 
by-side mergers of line-haul railroads operating in the same territory as most 
suitable form of mergers that would reduce excess capacity.85 Friedlaender also 
notes that mergers would increase market power of the remaining railroads 
substantially which would require regulation to be even more extensive.86
As a result of financial difficulties, many railroads were forced into 
bankruptcy. The industry’s average rate of return (see Figure 7 on page 45) 
stayed well below the 5.5 percent that the ICC regarded as an adequate rate of 
return.87 Most of the bankrupt railroads were acquired by or merged into 
financially sound railroads. The continuously poor financial situation of the 
railroad industry led to deterioration of track infrastructure due to deferred 
maintenance. Low speed and high accident rates made railroad transportation 
less attractive. Rolling stock often was in better condition since it was operated 
under lease.88 During the 1970s approximately 20% of the railroad industry 
operated under bankruptcy.89
85 Friedlaender, 1969, p. 139. See also Footnote 156 on page 78.
86 Friedlaender, 1969, p. 140.
87 Muller, 1988, p. 182.
88 Muller, 1988, p. 191.
89 Wood, 1990, p. 129.
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Class I Railroads' Rate of Return, 1928-1995
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Figure 7: Class I Railroads:90 Rate Of Return 1938 - 1995.91
In the 1970s, federal government countered these developments in order 
to improve the financial situation with the ultimate goal to improve railroad 
transportation service. The main provisions are listed below.
90 For details about railroad classes, see on page 93.
91 Data from Moody, 1996, p. a19. Years 1970-1981 include deferred taxes. Years 1982/83: 
Computations based on new depreciation Accounting System, computations also reflect the 
elimination of investment tax credit from net railway operating income. Not comparable to 
previous years.
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1. Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970
The main provisions of the Rail Passenger Service Act92 were:
■ Creation of Amtrak: The federal government took over the remaining intercity 
passenger service. Passenger service had become unprofitable due to 
substitution by private car traffic.
■ Railroads were granted greater autonomy in ratemaking and abandonment 
and merger processes were eased.
■ The ICC was given authority to eliminate rate regulation where it served "little 
or no useful public purpose" and was ordered to consider railroad revenue 
needs in judging rate reasonableness.
However, the ICC complied with the new rules reluctantly.93
2. Emergency Rail Services Act of 1970
The Emergency Rail Services Act94 authorized federal loan guarantees for 
bankrupt carriers. Background was the acute financial shortage of the Penn 
Central Railroad. It was estimated that the Penn Central alone would need 
additional $100,000,000 to survive the first quarter of 1971.95
92 Wood, 1990, p. 27.
93 Wilner, 1990.
94 Wilner, 1990.
95 House Report 91-1770, 12/16/70.
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3. Regional Rail Reorganization (3-R) Act of 1973
The preceding event that finally led to the 3-R Act was the bankruptcy of 
the Penn Central Railroad in 1970.96 The Penn Central resulted from a merger 
of three eastern railroads in 1968 and was the nation’s largest transportation 
company at that time. Under the 3-R Act most of the former Penn Central 
Railroad and five eastern railroads were merged into Consolidated Railroad 
Corporation (Conrail). Conrail finally became profitable in 1981. At that time it 
had consumed $7.5 billion in federal subsidies.
In addition, the 3-R Act authorized more governmental loan guarantees, 
and added direct grants and temporary operating subsidies for bankrupts.
4. Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform (4-R) Act of 
1976
The 4-R Act was targeted at “efforts to restructure the [railroad industry] 
on a more economically justified basis.”97 Its major provision was to systematize 
the abandonment process and the extension of the subsidy program 
nationwide.98
96 Dempsey, 1989, p. 157.
97 45 U.S.C. § 801 (a) (2) (1982). In Dempsey, 1989, p. 151.
98 Due, 1990, p. 18.
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5. The Staggers Rail Act of 1980
Section 2 of the Staggers Rail A c t" states:
“The Congress hereby finds that
(1) historically, railroads were the essential factor in the national 
transportation system;
(2) the enactment of the Interstate Commerce Act was essential to 
prevent an abuse of monopoly power by railroads and to establish 
and maintain a national railroads network;
(3) today, most transportation within the United States is 
competitive;
(4) many of the Government regulations affecting railroads have 
become unnecessary and inefficient;
(5) nearly two-thirds of the Nation’s intercity freight is transported by 
modes of transportation other than railroads;
(6) earnings by the railroad industry are the lowest of any 
transportation mode and are insufficient to generate funds of 
necessary capital improvements;
(7) by 1985, there will be a capital shortfall within the railroad 
industry of between $16,000,000,000 and $20,000,000,000;
(8) failure to achieve increased earnings within the railroad industry 
will result in either further deterioration of the rail system or the 
necessity for additional Federal subsidy; and
(9) modernization of economic regulation for the railroad industry 
with a greater reliance on the marketplace is essential in order to 
achieve maximum utilization of railroads to save energy and 
combat inflation.”
99 Public Law 96-448; 96th Congress; Oct. 14, 1980. For a brief summary see: “Deregulation: 
What happens next?”; Railway Age, Vol. 181, p. 10; October 27th, 1980.
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The Staggers Rail Act is enormously complex and often highly specific. It 
governs railroad rates and inter-carrier practices (Title II), railroad cost 
determinations (Title III), railroad modernization assistance (Title IV), and 
provisions for Conrail and other railroads and organizations. Its main provisions 
are:100
a. Zone of Rate Flexibility
Generally under the Staggers Act, each railroad may set its rates 
independently of the ICC and rate bureaus. Railroads were permitted to 
increase rates by 6 percent per year until 1984 with an aggregate increase to not 
more than 118 percent of the 1980 rates. After 1984, rates may raise by 4 
percent per year. The ICC may allow additional adjustments for inflation. There 
were provisions for surcharges in some cases such as interline traffic and on 
branch lines. Rates had not to be lower than variable cost.101
Rates were subject to ICC regulation only in markets where the railroad 
possessed market dominance. Market dominance meant an absence of 
effective competition from other rail carriers or modes of transportation for the 
transportation to which a rate applies.102 In those markets rates had to be
100 Public Law 96-448, see also Wood, p. 129.
101 Railroads may set rates below variable cost to engage in predatory pricing.
102 49 U.S.C. § 10707 (a).
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“reasonable”. That is, it had not to exceed 160 percent of variable cost. This 
percentage was raised subsequently to 180 percent in 1984. A shipper 
challenging a rate had the burden of proving that the rate is not reasonable if the 
rate exceeded the applicable revenue-variable cost percentage for the particular 
by less than 20 percent or if the revenue-variable cost percentage is lower than 
190.
b. Contract Rates
Contracts between railroads and individual shippers were legalized. A 
summary of nonconfidential contract terms had to be filed with the ICC. Rates, 
shipper, origin and destination did not have to be disclosed. Railroads were not 
allowed to commit more than 40% of their cars for agricultural products to 
contracts.103
c. Consolidation, Merger, and Acquisition o f Control
Existing guidelines were not changed in principle. Applications for 
transactions had to be filed with the ICC which approved or rejected the 
application. The ICC is required to consider at least (A) the effect of the 
proposed transaction on the adequacy of transportation to the public; (B) the
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effect on the public interest of including, or failing to include, other rail carriers in 
the area involved in the proposed transaction; (C) the total fixed charges that 
result from the proposed transaction; (D) the interest of carriers employees 
affected by the proposed transaction; (E) whether the proposed transaction 
would have an adverse effect on competition among rail carriers in the affected 
region.104 The Staggers Act eased transactions insofar that the considerations 
stated above must be made only if the transactions involves at least two Class I 
railroads.105 ICC merger approval conferred automatic antitrust immunity over 
these transactions.106 Provisions for acquisition of motor carriers were not 
changed.107
d. Abandonment
Railroads were still required to file applications for abandonments with the 
ICC, however, proceedings were further streamlined.108
103 For a brief summary see “ICC issues rules on contract rates”; Railway Age, Vol. 181, p. 12; 
November 10th, 1980.
104 49 U.S.C. § 11344 (b); clause (E) is added by the Staggers Act.
105 Public Law 96-448, Sec. 228.
106 Dempsey, 1989, p. 160.
107 See Footnote 60 on page 35.
108 Public Law 96-448, Sec. 402.
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6. Assessment of the Staggers Rail Act
The Staggers Act expressively favors the railroad industry. The federal 
government recognized the railroads’ economic plight under regulation. It has 
identified other modes of surface transportation - mainly the trucking industry - a 
real competitor for transportation. Although railroads constitute a natural 
monopoly with all its drawbacks and risks for public interest, deregulation is 
justified on the grounds of competition with the trucking industry. In economic 
terms that is, through competing with the trucking industry the railroad market will 
adjust at a socially optimal equilibrium.
With the Staggers Act railroads mainly gain control over ratemaking, an 
extremely valuable tool to work out individual pricing and marketing strategies. 
This, in turn, provides options to differentiate and to attract particular market 
segments. On the other hand, since railroads constitute a natural monopoly, 
pricing autonomy also confers ability to exploit market power. True, the Staggers 
Act provides some remedies for abuse of market power. Nevertheless, it is 
worthwhile to consider these remedies. Under the Staggers Act, both the zone 
for rate flexibility and the threshold for market power are defined in dependence 
on variable cost. Variable cost is a quantity internal to a firm that cannot be 
determined accurately from the outside. On the other hand, hurt shippers have 
the burden to prove that rates are outside the permitted zone. Given the nature
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of variable cost, shippers have extreme difficulties to set forth that proof. On the 
contrary, the provisions allow some leeway to manipulate on part of the railroads.
The political circumstances prevalent in 1980 give some indications that 
the movement towards railroad deregulation was not only economically but also 
politically motivated. First, through the bankruptcy of Conrail the federal 
government became directly involved in the poor economical condition of the 
railroads. The drain of considerable funds as subsidy for Conrail, which is 
located in the densely populated area immediately surrounding Washington, 
certainly had a stronger impact on decision makers than supposedly captive 
shippers109 being scattered somewhere in the West. Second, the airline industry 
that had been deregulated in 1978 exhibited some noticeably positive effects of 
deregulation immediately after deregulation.110 Consequently, deregulation was 
perceived to be a step into the right direction. Moreover, critics of deregulation 
hold that the ICC has become subsequently politicized.111 Since 1969, the 
President of the United States possessed the authority do designate the 
chairman among the commissioners of the ICC.112 Beginning in the Ford 
administration, all appointees to become ICC commissioners were strong 
advocates of deregulation. The most prominent example was its chairman
109 A shipper is denoted a captive shipper if its facility is served by one railroad and, due to 
volume or commodity constraints, another mode could not practicably be used to transport the 
traffic.
110 Blechschmidt, 1996, p. 37.
111 Dempsey, 1989, p. 223.
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appointed by President Carter, the economist Darius Gaskins. This politicization 
of the ICC brought about an interpretation of rules in favor of railroads.113
112 83 Stat. 859 (1969). In Dempsey, 1989, p. 233.
113 Friedlaender 1981, p. 103.
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CHAPTER IV.
OUTCOME OF DEREGULATION IN THE U.S. 
SURFACE TRANSPORTATION INDUSTRY
In this section of the study, outcomes of deregulation in the U.S. surface 
transportation industry will be examined. Based on the outcomes of deregulation 
in the U.S. surface transportation industry, the remaining part of this study it is 
analyzed (1) whether deregulation has achieved its economical goals and (2) 
whether anticompetitive effects have emerged. This chapter starts with a brief 
introduction of Industry Specific Measures and Classifications.
A. Industry Specific Measures and Classifications
1. Industry Specific Measures
a. Weight/Distance
A ton-mile is the movement of a ton the distance of one mile. A revenue 
ton-mile (also denoted freight revenue ton-mile) is the movement of the weight 
of a ton the distance of one mile where the railroad earns revenue for hauling 
that ton.
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b. Mileage
Miles of road owned is the aggregate length of roadway, excluding yard 
tracks and sidings, and does not reflect the parallel tracks. In contrast, miles of 
track owned includes multiple main tracks, yard tracks and sidings. Miles 
operated are miles of road owned plus trackage rights.
A train-mile is the movement of a train the distance of one mile. Train 
miles are based on the distance run between terminals.
2. Classifications of Railroads
There are three different classifications for railroads.
(a) Historically, all railroads had to report financial operating information to 
the ICC. Consequently, the ICC has classified railroads by their level of 
operating revenue into three classes. The revenue class thresholds have been 
changed in the past. Last changes were made in 1991 when the ICC set flexible 
thresholds adjusted annually for inflation. For 1994, Class I Railroads had 
operating revenue of $ 255.9 million or more114; Class II Railroads had revenues 
of $ 20.5 million to 255.9 million; and Class III Railroads had revenues of less
114 Since 1991, railroads with annual gross revenues of $250,000,000 or more, adjusted annually 
for inflation, are classified as Class I Railroads. For previous years, see Figure 9 on page 60.
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than $ 20.5 million. This classification system has been taken over by the STB in 
1996.115
(b) Railroads can also be classified by the nature and scope of their 
business as Line-haul, Switching and Terminal Railroads.
(c) The Association of American Railroads (AAR) classifies railroads into 
Class I, Regional, and Local Railroads. For Class I Railroads the AAR has 
adopted the STB definition. Regional Railroads are line-haul railroads that 
operate at least 350 miles of road and/or earning revenue between $40 million 
and the Class I threshold. Local Railroads are line haul railroads falling below 
the regional criteria, plus all Switching and Terminal Railroads. .
Figure 8 on page 58 depicts number, miles operated, number of 
employees, and freight revenue by type of railroad for 1995.
115 Railroad Facts, 1996, p. 3.
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Figure 8: Industry Totals By Type Of Railroad For 1997.116
a. Dominance o f Class I Railroads
The railroad industry has always been dominated by Class I railroads. 
Generically, Class I railroads operate long-haul freight trains carrying a 
considerable number of freight tons which in turn generate a large amount of ton 
miles and high total revenues. In contrast, revenues and hence operations of 
regional and local railroads are considerably lower due to fewer ton miles 
generated. Figure 8 on page 58 and Figure 9 on page 60 indicate that Class I 
railroads always have accounted for the main share of total ton miles, total
116 Railroad Facts, 1996, p. 3. Data modified for 01/01/97.
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freight revenue, total miles operated, and number of employees. Therefore, this 
study will focus on Class I railroads.
B. Concentration of Class I Railroads
Concentration has never been unusual in the railroad industry.117 In the 
past, both potential gains and potential drawbacks of concentration have been 
scrutinized and their consequences are well known.118 The Staggers Act did not 
change existing consolidation guidelines in principle.119 Merger approval by the 
ICC conferred automatic antitrust immunity.120 Figure 9 on page 60 shows that 
the number of Class I railroads has been declining constantly. The drop of Class 
I railroads in the 1970s can be traced to mergers following bankruptcies and to 
the redefinition of Class I railroads in 1978 (Figure 9 on page 60). Consolidation 
has often been a process over several years, starting with partial acquisition, 
subsequent acquisition of a controlling interest by the parent, and finally a 
merger into the parent.121
117 See Conant, 1964.
118 See Footnote 84 on page 43.
119 See Consolidation, Merger, and Acquisition of Control on page 50.
120 See Footnote 106 on page 51.
121 Firm combinations can be classified (1) by the scope of business of the combining firms and 
(2) by the method of consummating the combination. (1) (a) Horizontal combination: The 
combining firms are located in the same industry and at the same stage of the value chain; (b) 
vertical combination: The combining firms are located at different stages of the value chain 
(upstream or downstream); (c) unrelated combination: There is no direct relation between the 
combining firms. (2) (a) Statutory merger. At least one firm is absorbed into another one and
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Figure 9: Class I Railroads: Number Of Firms, Share Of Total Line-Haul Mileage, Annual 
Revenue Threshold For Class I Railroads, 1970 - 1996.122
ceases to exist; (b) statutory consolidation: At least one firm is absorbed into a specifically new 
created firm which is the only remaining firm; (c) asset acquisition: If no controlling interest is 
acquired, the selling firm survives, if a controlling interest is acquired, the selling firm may survive 
as subsidiary; (d) stock acquisition: Both firms survive, the parent has an intercompany 
investment and may have a controlling interest.
122 Number of Class I Railroads: The number reflects the number of firms by 12/31 in that year 
except for the years 1977/78/79. Data for the year 1977 reflect Class I Railroads as of 12/31/76, 
Data for the year 1978 reflect Class I Railroads as of 03/07/78, data for the year 1979 reflect 
Class I Railroads as of October 1979. See also Footnote 114. Share of total line-haul mileage: 
Association of American Railroads, PL&E Department, 1997. For explanation see 
Weight/Distance on page 55. See also Figure 15.
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The consolidation trend further continued after 1980. Figure 9 on page 60 
indicates that the number of Class I railroads has dropped from 39 to 9 since 
1980. However, Class I railroads’ share of total line-haul mileage has not 
changed significantly over these years. In 1970, 69 firms accounted for 85% of 
the total mileage where in 1996 just 9 firms accounted for 78% of the total 
mileage. Figure 10 on page 63 and Figure 11 on page 64 show the 
development of consolidation in more detail. The 69 Class I railroads that 
existed 1970 have since consolidated into nine Class I railroads or have dropped 
out of the Class I category (mainly due to class redefinitions). Figure 12 on page 
65 depicts the proportions of the nine Class I railroads that presently exist.
These firms can be subdivided into the major five and four minor railroads. Four 
of the five major railroads emerged during the 1980s. The fifth, Conrail, was 
created in the 1970s by virtue of law following the bankruptcy of the Penn 
Central Railroad.123 Two of the minor Class I railroads were controlled by the 
Canadian Railroads.124 The consolidation trend did not halt yet. Presently, 
Conrail is to be shared out among CSX and Norfolk Southern.125 In June, 1997, 
Union Pacific gained an interest in Mexico’s North Pacific Railroad which
123 See Regional Rail Reorganization (3-R) Act of 1973 on page 47.
124 see Footnote 129 on page 65.
125 Carey, 1997.
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connects Union Pacific as far as Mexico City.126 Facing increased transportation 
volume in conjunction with NAFTA, this is an important strategic step.
126 Omaha World Herald, 06/27/97.
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yearl 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77
Burlington Northern R.R.
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R.R. 
Colorado & Southern Ry.
Fort Worth & Denver Ry.
St. Louis-San Francisco Ry.
Toledo, Peoria & Western R.R.
Oregon Electric Ry. Co.
Central R.R. Co. of New Jersey 
Erie-Lackawanna Ry. Co.
Lehigh Valley R.R.
Penn Central Transportation Co. 
Reading Co.
Ann Arbor R.R.
Pennsylvania-Reading Seashore Lines
CSX Corp.
Seaboard Coast Line R.R.
Baltimore & Ohio R.R.
Chesapeaeke & Ohio Ry.
Western Maryland Ry.
Louisville & Nashville R.R.
Clinchfield R.R.
Georgia R.R., Lessee Organization 
Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. 
Atlanta & West Point R.R. Co.
Western Ry. of Alabama 
Monon R.R.
Grand Trunk Western R.R.
Detroit, Toledo & Ironton R.R. 
Duluth, Winnipeg & Pacific Ry. 
Central Vermont Ry., Inc.
Detroit & Toledo Shore Line R.R.
Illinois Central R.R.
Gulf, Mobile & Ohio R.R.
Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. 
Norfolk Southern
Southern Ry.
Norfolk & Western Ry. Co.
Central of Georgia Ry.
Alabama Great Southern R.R.
Cinncinati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific Ry. 
Georgia Southern & Florida Ry.
Illinois Terminal R.R.
Akron, Canton & Youngston R.R.
Soo Line R.R.
Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific R.R. 
Minneapolis, Northfield & Southern Ry.
Union Pacific R.R.
Southern Pacific Transportation Co. 
Chicago & North Western Ry. System 
Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R. 
St. Louis Southwestern Ry. 
Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R.
Missouri Pacific R.R.
Western Pacific R.R.
Northwestern Pacific R.R.
Texas & Pacific Ry.
Chicago & Easten Illinois R.R. 
Missouri-lllinois R.R.
Spokane International R.R. Co.
78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 1 91 92 93 94 95 96
Figure 10: Class I Railroads ultimately merged into, acquired by or controlled by majority by 1997 
Class I Railroads, 1970 - 1997.127
127 Moody, 1996, editions 1971-1996. A dot indicates that the railroad was listed as Class I 
railroad by 12/31 in that year. The vertical lines indicate years of major redefinitions of Class I
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fiulford 1 ransportation Co. 
Boston & Maine Corp. 
Delaware & Hudson Ry. Co. 
Maine Central RR
Independent Class I Railroads 
Ron da East Coast Ry.
Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry. 
Pittsburgh & Lake Erie RR 
Bessemer & Lake Erie RR  
Duluth, Mssabe & Iran Range Ry. 
Long Island RR
Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific RR  
Mchigan Interstate Ry. Co.
Chicago & Illinois Mdand Ry. 
Bangor & Aroostook R R 
Ato-Train Corp.
Canadian Pacific Lines in Mainev 
Texas Mexican Ry. Co.
Green Bay & VNfestem RR  
Lake Superior Ishpemng RR 
Monongahela Ry., Co.
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Figure 11: Class I Railroads Not Merged Into Or Acquired By Other Class I Railroads, 1970 - 
1997.128
railroads. See also Footnote 122, section Number of Class I Railroads. The Figure shows the 
ultimate outcome of combinations only, it does not account for intermediate combinations. The 
company histories were traced for data on combinations. Numbers in parentheses denote page 
numbers in Moody, 1996 edition, for histories of individual companies: Burlington Northern, Inc. 
(a1), Burlington Northern Santa Fe Corp. (BNSF) (a15), Illinois Central Corp. (a28), Illinois 
Central R.R. Co (a39), Kansas City Southern Industries, Inc. (a48), Kansas City Southern Railway 
Company: (a69), Norfolk Southern Corp. (a76), Norfolk Southern Railway, Inc. (a89), Norfolk and 
Western Railway Corp. (a101), Union Pacific Corp.: (a10), Missouri Pacific R.R. Co. (a27), Union 
Pacific R.R. Co. (a133), Soo Line Corp. (a215), Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. (a403), 
Santa Fe Pacific Corp. (a455), Grand Trunk Corp. (a243), Grand Trunk Western Railroad Co. (a 
245), CSX Corp. (a421), Conrail, Inc. (a416). R.R. = Railroad, Ry. = Railway.
128 Moody, editions 1971-1996. A dot indicates that the railroad was listed as class I railroad by 
12/31 in that year. The vertical lines indicate years of major redefinitions of Class I railroads. See 
also Footnote 122, section Number of Class I Railroads. Company histories were traced for data 
on combinations (Moody, various editions). R.R. = Railroad, Ry. = Railway.
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Figure 12: Class I Railroads: Miles Of Road Owned, Revenue Ton Miles, Operating Revenue, 
1997.129
Figure 12 on page 65 does not include Amtrak because it is primarily a 
passenger railroad. Amtrak was created in 1970 to take over the remaining 
intercity passenger service.130 Amtrak does not own track except the “Northeast 
Corridor” and some branchlines in Pennsylvania and Massachusetts.131 Outside 
its trackage, passenger trains are operated under trackage rights agreement with
129 Railroad Facts, 1996, p. 68-77. 1995 data. Data for Union Pacific is calculated by adding data 
for Union Pacific and Southern Pacific which was merged into Union Pacific in August 1996. The 
Grand Trunk Western Railroad Company was a wholly owned subsidiary of Canadian National 
Railway Company (since 1971). In 1995 it was merged into its parent. The Soo Line is a wholly 
owned subsidiary of Canadian Pacific Railway (since 1990). (McGonigal, 1996).
130 See
Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 on page 46.
131 Dooley, 1994, p. 129. The Northeast Corridor is the railroad between Washington and Boston. 
Amtrak owns 750 miles of track and operates 24,500 miles of track. Its 1995 revenues were $1.25 
billion (Railroad Facts, 1996, p. 78). For an overview of Amtrak’s operations, see Dooley, 1994, 
Chapter 9.
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the cooperating railroads. Railroads are required to provide their tracks to 
Amtrak at reasonable rates for operation of passenger services. Besides intercity 
service Amtrak provides commuter service in some metropolitan areas.132
1. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is a statistical measure of market 
concentration and a proxy for market power.133 It is used by the Department of 
Justice (DoJ) and by the Federal Reserve Board in the analysis of competitive 
effects of mergers. The HHI accounts for the number of firms as well as their 
relative size (market share) in the relevant market (with respect to product and 
geographic area). The HHI asserts market power increases geometrically, not 
linearly, with increase in market share. The HHI is calculated by squaring the 
market shares of all firm in the relevant market and then summing the squares, 
as follows:
n
H H I = £ ( M S i ) 2 .
1 =  1
A HHI approaching zero means perfect competition because this would 
mean there are very many firms, all with very small market shares. In contrast, a 
HHI of 10,000 means pure monopoly because one firm with 100% market share
132 Dooley, 1994, p. 144.
133 Rhoades, 1986.
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has an HHI of 10,000. However, the HHI should be applied with caution. 
Although it weights larger market shares heavier than small ones (by squaring 
market shares), the correlation between squared market share and 
anticompetitive effects has been chosen arbitrarily. Secondly, the HHI is often 
applied improperly by basing it on national market shares rather than on relevant 
(local) market shares. To illustrate, assume the 1995 market shares for Class I 
railroads: at the national level, the revenue ton-mile based HHI would be 2384. 
However, there is no place in the U.S. that is served by all Class I railroads. 
Furthermore, since railroads operate on different road networks, not every 
railroad that serves a particular location will serve the destination of the shipment 
which further shrinks the relevant market. Hence, the real HHI faced by 
customers is always higher than the national one. For example, a local market 
served by two railroads with equal market shares (assuming both railroads serve 
the same destinations) would yield an HHI of 5,000.
In 1968, the Department of Justice (DoJ) published formal guidelines for 
horizontal mergers which were revised in 1982, 1984, 1992, and 1997.134 The 
guidelines reflect the enforcement policy of the DoJ and the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) concerning horizontal mergers subject to section 7 of the 
Clayton Act, to section 1 of the Sherman Act, or to section 5 of the Federal Trade
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Commission Act.135 The focus is on prevention of market power, which is defined 
as “the ability profitably to maintain prices above competitive levels for a 
significant period of time.”136 Market power is seen as a function of market 
concentration. Therefore, the DoJ and the FTC apply the HHI in determining the 
level of concentration. Individual market shares are based on “the best indicator 
of firms’ future competitive significance.”137 The guidelines account for the 
relevant market which is defined by product and geographic area. The general 
standards of the guidelines are:138
1. Where the post-merger HHI is less than 1,000 (“unconcentrated market”), the 
merger will be challenged only in “extraordinary circumstances”.
2. Where the post-merger HHI is between 1,000 and 1,800 (“moderately 
concentrated market”), and the merger increases the HHI by more than 100 
points, the government is “likely” to challenge the merger unless other factors 
suggest “the merger is not likely to substantially lessen competition.”
3. Where the post-merger HHI is over 1,800 (“highly concentrated market”), and 
the merger increases the HHI by more than 50 points, the government is
134 U.S. Department of Justice, 1997. In the context of these guidelines, the term “merger” 
encompasses all types of firm combinations. See Footnote 121 on page 59.
135 Section 7 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. § 18) declares illegal stock or asset acquisition by any 
person or business of another “where in any line of commerce or in any activity affecting 
commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to 
lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly". For section 1 of the Sherman Act see 
Footnote 44 on page 29. Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. § 45) 
declares unlawful unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or 
affecting commerce.
136 U.S. Department of Justice, 1997, p. 2.
137 U.S. Department of Justice, 1997, p. 14. If firms are distinguished primarily by differentiation of 
their products, then dollar sales generally will be used. If firms are distinguished primarily on the 
basis of their relative advantages in serving different buyers or groups of buyers, then unit sales 
generally will be used.
138 U.S. Department of Justice, 1997, p. 16.
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“likely” to challenge the merger unless other factors suggest “the merger is not 
likely to substantially lessen competition.”
Judgments based on HHI values can be influenced by the following factors:
A. Collusion
Ease of collusion makes anticompetitive post-merger effects more likely and 
hence will impede merger approval. Ease of collusion is examined through 
proxies.
B. Entry
The Department of Justice finds: “A merger is not likely to create or enhance 
market power or to facilitate its exercise, if entry into the market is so easy that 
market participants, after the merger, either collectively or unilaterally could 
not profitably maintain a price increase above premerger levels. Such entry 
likely will deter an anticompetitive merger in its incipiency, or deter or 
counteract the competitive effects of concern.”139 Entry is easy if it is (1) 
timely, (2) likely, and (3) sufficient to deter anticompetitive behavior. An entry 
alternative is considered to be timely if a significant impact on prices in the 
relevant market can be achieved within two years from initial planning. An
139 U.S. Department of Justice, 1997, p. 25.
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entry alternative is considered to be likely if it would be profitable at premerger 
prices and if the entrant could secure such prices (i.e., the entrant faces the 
demand corresponding to his price). An entry alternative is considered to be 
sufficient if (1) the entrant has access to essential assets in the same way as 
the incumbent does and (2) the character and scope of the entrant’s products 
is fully responsive to local sales opportunities created by the merger.
C. Efficiencies
Greater post merger efficiencies facilitate merger approval if (1) efficiencies 
are cognizable and (2) of a character and magnitude such that the merger is 
not likely to be anticompetitive in any relevant market.140
D. Failing Firm
Merger approval is facilitated if one of the merging firms is failing and will 
hence exit the market anyway.
140 Cognizable efficiencies are efficiencies that can (1) unambiguously be traced to the merger 
{merger-specific efficiency) and (2) do not arise from anticompetitive reductions in output or 
service. The second condition for Cognizability was excluded in the 1992 merger guidelines. In 
the 1982 guidelines, efficiencies had to be shown by "clear and convincing (in an engineering 
sense)” evidence. Greater efficiency was generally excluded from the 1968 guidelines (Coate, 
1994, p. 48n).
71
Table III on page 71 shows the area of operation of Class I railroads. The 
railroad HHI is calculated for different regions in Table IV on page 72 based upon 
the data found in Figure 12 on page 65. Amtrak has been included since it 
competes with freight railroads in the express freight sector.141 A HHI calculated 
for large regions, such as shown in Table IV on page 76, certainly does not 
accurately reflect the real situation any one local shipper. A specific shipper may 
face a competitive regional market, but rail service at the shipper’s door most 
likely is monopolistic.
Amtrak United States
BNSF West of Missouri River
Conrail Official Territory142
CSX East of Missouri River
Grand Trunk Western Michigan/Great Lakes
Illinois Central Chicago-New Orleans
Kansas City Southern Kansas City-Gulf Coast
Norfolk Southern East of Missouri River
Soo Line Minnesota/Lake Michigan States
Union Pacific West of Missouri River
Table III: Class I Railroads: Area Of Operation.143
141 Wall Street Journal, 07/30/97.
142 The Official Territory encompasses the New England, the Mid Atlantic, and the Great Lakes 
States. Friedlaender, 1981, p. 110.
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United States
BNSF, Conrail, 
CSX, GTW, IC, 
KCS, NFS, Soo, UP
1995 1853 2384
West of Missouri River BNSF, UP 5388 4647 5229
Official Territory 
(before sharing out of Conrail)
Conrail, CSX, NFS 3384 2877 3482
Official Territory 
(after sharing out Conrail)
CSX, NFS 5022 4229 5033
East of Missouri River 5042 4023 5058
Gulf Coast BNSF, IC, KCS, UP 4667 4078 4676
State of Ohio CSX, NFS, Conrail, 
Soo, IC, GTW,
2689 2335 2706
Table IV: Class I Railroads: HHI By Selected Regions.144
The results shown in Table IV on page 72 indicate that the HHIs for all 
regions are well above the DoJ HHI threshold of 1,800 where anticompetitive 
effects are likely to be prevalent. Regarding the proposed sharing out of Conrail, 
the increase in the HHI will be more than 30 times higher than tolerable under 
the DoJ merger guidelines of an increase in HHI of 50. The results further 
confirm the theoretical consideration that regional HHIs tend to be higher than 
global ones. This is crucial insofar that the HHIs will be even higher when 
calculated for specific local markets since the local market HHI for rail is likely to 
be 10,000.
143 Based on McGonigal, 1996.
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The immense deviation from existing antitrust guidelines in favor of 
concentration can be traced to the general antitrust attitude during the Reagan 
administration. No administration before Reagan had enforced antitrust 
regulations in such a pro-merger way. The Reagan administration allowed 
mergers the guidelines would appear to prohibit.145 Figure 13 on page 74 and 
Figure 14 on page 75 reveal that in these years the number and the total value 
of business combinations have been extraordinarily high. Eisner holds that the 
policy change in antitrust enforcement in the 1980s was less a product of 
presidential or congressional politics than a product of changes within the 
bureaucracy initiated well before the 1980 elections.146 This is credible insofar as 
much of the deregulation movement in the transportation industry was initiated 
by the Carter administration, and took place before 1982 (see Table II on page 
39).
The trend towards more liberal antitrust policy in the 1980s also is 
reflected in the merger guidelines. The 1982 guidelines provided a more liberal 
approach to merger enforcement than the 1968 guidelines, and the 1984, and 
1992 amendments continue this liberalizing trend. More specifically, when 
compared to the 1968 guidelines, the 1982, 1984 and 1992 guidelines set forth a
144 Data based on data in Figure 12 on page 65. HHIR is based on annual revenue, where HHIRA 
includes Amtrak. HHIT is based on annual revenue ton miles.
145 Coate, 1994, p. 61.
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much higher threshold for identifying concentrated markets, give less 
significance to concentration analysis, and give more weight to an analysis of 
other factors, such as entry and efficiencies.147
Number of combinations, 1955-1989
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Figure 13: Number Of Business Combinations, 1955 - 1989.148
146 Eisner, 1994, p. 75.
147 Tompson, 1996.
148 Blair, 1993, p. 63. Blair classified combinations on the basis of the primary industry codes of 
the combining firms (SIC).
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Value of combinations, in 1995 billion $, 1955-1989
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Figure 14: Value Of Business Combinations, In 1995 Dollar, 1955 - 1989.149
149 Blair, 1993, p. 63. Data adjusted for 1995 $ (by GDP deflator). See also Footnote 148.
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C. Operations
Generally, the profitability of railroads can be determined by the formula
profitab 'I ty -^ Uant^  revenue Senera^n§ items
quantity o f cost generating items
revenue ton miles 
length o f  road  *  train hour *  employee '
Recommendations to increase profitability are summarized in Table V on 
page 76. These are derived from the general formula for profitability. 
Technically, raising rates is also an alternative to increase profitability, but a 
highly unpopular one which should not be considered in the presence of other 
alternatives.
In the following, it will be examined what changes railroad operation were
load per car length of road owned
number of cars per train transit time of trains
length of haul number of employees
Table V: Determinants Of Railroad Profitability.
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subject to after deregulation and to what extend railroads were able to increase 
profitability.
Since 1976 Class I railroads have streamlined their road network 
considerably. Miles of road owned have been reduced by almost one half (see 
Figure 15 on page 79). These reductions have been realized only in parts 
through abandonment. A large part of the track has been sold off to newly 
established Short-Line Railroads operating in low traffic density areas. Their 
different cost structure makes operations profitable in those areas where 
business is unprofitable for Class I railroads. Between 1980 and 1986, 41% of 
the mileage divested by Class I railroads was taken over by newly established 
short-line railroads.150
By now, short-lines operate about 20% of the industry’s track.151 Between 
1980 and 1989, 224 new local or regional railroads have been established.152 In 
1996, there were about 60 families of short lines across the country. The largest 
short-line operator, RailTex Inc., operates 26 short-line railroads.153 Generally,
150 Rockey, 1987. See also Figure 15 and Figure 8. For history, statistics and analysis of short-line 
Railroads see also Due (1984) and Horn (1989) and Wolfe (1989).
151 See Figure 8 on page 58 and Figure 9 on page 60.
152 Wolfe, 1989, p. 13.
153 DiBennedetto, 1996. See also Figure 8.
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short-lines and line-haul railroads form a hub-and-spoke system '5* That is, 
short-lines originate at line-haul terminals and spread across the surrounding 
area, providing rail connection to the hinterland and consolidating freight for line- 
haul railroads. This way, short-lines provide one third of the business for Class I 
railroads.155
Between 1976 and 1982, Class I railroads made considerable investments 
in (remaining) way and structures (see.Figure 16 on page 80).
The number of accidents decreased significantly (see Figure 17 on page 
81) which indicates higher quality of transportation by railroad.
The average length of haul has distinctly increased since deregulation 
(Figure 18 on page 82).
The increase can be explained by the concentration of Class I railroads, 
especially the large number of end-to-end mergers which facilitate longer, 
uninterrupted hauls.156
154 See Figure 29 on page 104.
155 Lafferty, 1996.
156 For an econometric analysis of types of mergers, see Harris, 1983; and Levin, 1979. End-to- 
end mergers in contrast to parallel mergers (also denoted side-by-side mergers) are found to 
increase market share and quality of service, but not necessarily to reduce costs. See also 
Footnote 85 on page 44. Different from Friedlaender’s assumptions, end-to-end merger have 
proven to be the preferable type of merger. This is comprehensible insofar that parallel mergers, 
to achieve reduction of excess capacity, imply substantial abandonment which might not be 
feasible in practice. Hence, parallel mergers rather create excess capacity than reducing it. On
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Railroad Industry: Miles of Line Haul
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Figure 15: Industry Miles Of Line-Haul, 1940-1995.157
the other hand, end-to-end merger extend the railroad’s sphere of influence and its territory and 
yields more efficient and less costlier operations (through reduction of interchanges). These 
effects m
ay offset drawbacks from additional capacity.
157 Association of American Railroads, PL&E Department, 1997. For explanation see 
Weight/Distance on page 55.
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Class I Railroads: Expenditures for Way and Structures, 
in million 1995 Dollars, 1940 -1995
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Figure 16: Class I Railroads: Expenditures For Way And Structures, In 1995 Dollars, 1940 - 
1995.158
158 Moody, 1995, p. a20. GDP deflator. See United States Government Printing Office, 1997.
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Accidents per million train-miles
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I  ■
Figure 17: Number Of Rail Accidents Per Million Train-Miles,159 1980-1995.160
159 For explanation, see Weight/Distance on page 55.
160 Railroad Facts, 1996, p. 63. No separate data is available for derailments in the years 1981- 
1984. Data coverall railroads.
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Class I Railroads: Average length of haul (m iles)
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Figure 18: Class I Railroads: Average Length Of Haul, 1940 - 1995.161
Moreover, the longer the haul, the larger is the competitive advantage of 
the railroad over the truck. The break-even distance where railroad service 
becomes more profitable than truck service is about 500-700 miles.162 End-to- 
end mergers enabled the railroads to further extend their advantage in hauling 
heavy load over long distances.
161 Railroad Facts, 1996, p. 36.
162 United States General Accounting Office (GAO), 1993, p. 23. See also The Economics of 
Intermodal Transportation on page 102.
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Figure 19 on page 83 indicates that total freight revenue tons originated 
by Class I railroads have declined after deregulation (only revenue tons of coal
i
and chemicals and plastics have increased).163
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1200
1000
800
600
400
200
Metallic Ores
Lumber & Wood 
Food Products
Farm Products
Nonmetallic
Minerals
Coal, Chemicals
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
n ii i  others
i— i T ransportation 
Equipment 
i— i Pulp & Paper
r— i Scrap materials
m  Petroleum
m  Stone, Clay & glass 
products 
H i  Primary Metal
i— i Metallic Ores
r — i Lumber & Wood
i— i Food Products
Farm Products
Nonmetallic Minerals
Coal
Chemicals & Plastics
i n N O ) T - r t i f i S f f i ' - n t n N ® r n i n( 0 i 0 i 0 r - r ^ - | s - N - r > . c o c o c o c o c o o > 0 ) O >0 > 0 ) 0 ) 0 ) 0 ) 0 ) 0 ) 0 ) ( n 0 > ( ^ 0 ) 0 ) 0 ) 0 ) 0 )
Figure 19: Class I Railroads: Freight Revenue Tons Originated, With Respect To Goods Carried, 
In Million Tons, 1965 - 1995.164
1S3 The considerable increase in revenue ton-miles of coal can be attributed to the discovery of the 
large deposits of low-sulfur coal in the Powder River Basin in Wyoming in the 1970s.
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This implies, assuming costs of input factors have kept constant, that 
expenditures for loading and unloading of trains have also decreased. In 
comparison, the number of revenue ton miles - the basis for freight revenue - has 
increased (Figure 20 on page 84).
Class I Railroads: Revenue ton miles, revenue ton miles per average length of haul, freight 
revenue, and freight revenue per revenue ton mile, 1940 -1995
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Figure 20: Class I Railroads: Freight Revenue Ton Miles, Revenue Ton Miles Per Average Length 
Of Haul, Total Freight Revenue, And Freight Revenue Per Ton-Mile, 1940 - 1995.165
164 Moody, 1996, pp. a10-a12. "others” consist of machinery, electrical equipment, fabricated 
metal products, and freight forwarder traffic.
165 Freight revenue ton-miles: Moody, 1996, p. a5, or Moody, 1996, p. a2, and Railroad Facts, 
1996, p. 27 (not all years); revenue ton miles per average length of haul: (calculated); total freight 
revenue: Railroad Facts, 1996, p. 13, missing data are calculated (freight revenue ton miles times 
freight revenue per ton mile), calculations match data where available; freight revenue per ton
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Since the number of tons originated has actually decreased, the increase 
in revenue ton miles must be caused by an increase in the average length of 
haul (Figure 18 on page 82). This is confirmed by the quotient of revenue ton 
miles and average length of haul which is constant over the years (Figure 20 on 
page 84).166
Average revenue tons per train load have increased (Figure 21 on page 
86) where average tons per carload have not changed.167 That is, trains have 
become longer (more cars per train). This is in opposition to improved service 
since it implies a reduced train frequency.
mile: Moody, 1996, p. a5 and Railroad Facts, 1996, p. 30. Financial data are adjusted for 1995 
Dollars (by GDP deflator).
166 “Revenue ton miles per average length of haul” do not necessarily have to be equal to 
“revenue tons originated” because the data for “average length of haul” is not as accurate as data 
for “revenue ton miles” since it is not weighted by tons carried per haul (train). That is, a train 
consisting of 10 cars contributes as much to “average length of haul” as a train consisting of 100 
cars hauled over the same distance does. On the other hand, “revenue ton miles” accurately 
reflect tons hauled over distance).
167 Railroad Facts, 1996, p. 37.
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Class I Railroads: Average revenue tons per train load, 
in tons, 1940 - 1995
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Figure 21: Class I Railroads: Average Revenue Tons Per Train Load, 1940 - 1995.168
The number of employees and hence total annual compensation have 
been reduced by 25% between 1980 and 1982 and by another 25% since 1982 
(Figure 22 on page 87). The drop in the number of employees was mainly due 
to reduction in crew sizes.169 However, compensation per employee has 
increased. This was due to an increased share of higher qualified employees.
168 Moody, 1996, p. a2, and Railroad Facts, 1996, p. 37 (not all years).
169 Keaton, 1991. See also MacDonald, 1996.
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Class I Railroads: Number of employees, total compensation, 
and compensation per employee, 1940 -1995
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Figure 22: Class I Railroads: Number Of Employees, Total Compensation, And Compensation 
Per Employee, 1940 - 1995.170
170 Total annual compensation: Moody, 1996, p. a21, or Moody, 1996, p. a25, and Railroad Facts, 
1996, p. 55 (not all years); annual average number of employees: Moody, 1996, p. a25, and 
Railroad Facts, 1996, p. 55 (not all years); annual compensation per employee: Calculated (total 
annual compensation divided by average number of employees); Financial data are adjusted for 
1995 Dollars (by GDP deflator).
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Class I Railroads: Ton miles per train hour, train miles per train hour, labor expenses per ton 
mile, ton miles per mile of road owned, ton miles per employee, 1940 -1995
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Figure 23: Class I Railroads: Net Ton Miles171 Per Train Hour, Train Miles Per Train Hour, Labor 
Expenses Per Revenue Ton Mile, Revenue Ton Miles Per Mile Of Road Owned (Traffic Density), 
Revenue Ton Miles Per Employee, 1940 - 1995.172
171 A net ton mile is equal to a revenue ton mile including exclusive work equipment and motorcar 
trains. In 1995, Class I railroads carried 1,305,688 million revenue ton miles and 1,315,381 million 
net ton miles. (Railroad Facts, 1996, p. 38) Therefore, for the purpose of this study, both numbers 
can be treated to be equal.
172 Net ton miles per train hour. Moody, 1996, p. a22, and Railroad Facts, 1996, p. 38 (not all 
years). Figures for 1980 and beyond are not directly comparable to earlier years because of an 
STB definitional change requiring the inclusion of terminal delay in counting train hours. That is, in 
terms of the former definition of revenue ton miles per train hour, figures for 1980 and beyond are 
actually higher. Train miles per train hour. Calculated (revenue ton miles per train hour divided by 
average revenue tons per train load). Labor expenses per revenue ton mile: calculated; revenue 
ton miles per mile of road owned: (calculated); revenue ton miles per employee: (calculated). 
Financial data are adjusted for 1995 Dollars (by GDP deflator).
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Figure 20 on page 84 indicates that total freight revenue and freight 
revenue per ton-mile has decreased significantly since deregulation. Although 
freight revenue per ton mile is not an exact surrogate for freight rates because it 
is affected by changes in traffic composition and length of haul, it does record 
the level of revenue received by railroads for providing the basic transportation 
service, which is hauling of weight over distance.173 However, the increase in 
ton-miles after deregulation can be attributed to an increase in the average 
length of haul. The number of tons originated has declined, as has total real 
freight revenue. Real freight revenue per ton originated has increased since 
deregulation (Figure 24 on page 90). Marginal costs of hauling freight over an 
extra mile are low compared to costs of loading and unloading. Thus, the 
increase in length of haul allowed railroads charge more per haul at nearly 
unchanged costs.
173 Railroad Facts, 1996, p. 30.
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Class I Railroads: Freight revenue per revenue ton 
originated in thousand 1995$, 1965 - 1995
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Figure 24: Class I Railroads: Freight Revenue Per Revenue Ton Originated In Thousand 1995 
Dollar, 1965- 1995.174
Operational efficiency increases of Class I railroads are depicted in Figure 
23 on page 88. It shows that revenue ton miles per train hour (speed), per mile 
of road owned (traffic density), and per employee (productivity) have increased 
significantly since deregulation. However, the actual speed of trains has not 
been increased. The increase in revenue ton miles per train hour is a sole result 
of longer trains. Figure 25 on page 91 summarizes the operational efficiency 
increases of Class I railroads. Operational efficiency has increased nominally by
91
almost 600% since 1980. Taking into account that real compensation per 
employee has increased and revenue per ton mile has decreased yields a real 
operational efficiency increase of 350% since 1980.
Class I RR:
revenue ton miles per train hour per 
mile of road owned per employee 
(tons/#_of_t ra i ns/hour/em ploy ee); 
standardized for 1980
Class I RR:
annual freight revenue per train hour 
per mile of road owned per annual 
labor expenses (1995$) (1/#_of_ 
trains/hour/mile); standardized for 
1980
o>
Figure 25: Class I Railroads: Revenue Ton Miles Per Train Hour Per Mile Of Road Owned Per 
Employee, Annual Freight Revenue Per Train Hour Per Mile Of Road Owned Per Annual Labor 
Expenses, 1940 -1995. Standardized For 1980.175
174 Data calculated by dividing total freight revenue (Moody, 1996, p. a. 12) by total revenue tons 
originated (Moody, 1996, p. a. 12). Revenue is adjusted for 1995 Dollars (by GDP deflator).
175 Revenue ton miles per train hour. See Footnote 172; miles of road owned: See Footnote 157; 
number of employees: See Footnote 170; annual freight revenue: See Footnote 165; annual labor 
expenses: See Footnote 170. Financial data are adjusted for 1995 Dollars (by GDP deflator).
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Recall Figure 6 on page 42 which shows that the railroads increased their 
share of total intercity freight traffic since 1980. Also recall Figure 7 on page 45 
which shows the rate of return of Class I railroads has increased significantly 
since deregulation.
D. Contract Rates
There are about 90,000 contracts in force in early 1990, affecting 60% of 
total rail traffic, 86% of coal tonnage, 63% of grain volume, and 54% of * 
chemicals traffic.176 In 1996, almost 70% of all rail traffic moved under 
contracts.177 Railroad contract filing requirements were eliminated except for 
contracts for movement of agricultural commodities in 1997.178
E. Deregulation of the Trucking Industry
The emergence of the trucking industry has been regarded as a major 
factor of the poor performance of the railroad industry, which ultimately led to 
railroad deregulation. In 1980, the year the railroad industry was deregulated, 
also the trucking industry was deregulated. In this section, the major aspects of
176 Wilner, 1990.
177 Railroad Facts, 1996, p. 6.
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the deregulation of the trucking industry are highlighted. The section starts with 
an introduction of industry specific classifications.
1. Classifications of Trucking Firms
Statistical information in the trucking industry has some caveats due to 
complex classification systems of carriers that are often mixed up.
a. Standard Industry Classification
The motor freight transportation and warehousing industry groups are 
classified into nine industries. Among those the most important are Local 
Trucking without Storage (SIC 4212), Local Trucking with Storage (SIC 
4214), Trucking, except Local (SIC 4213) (also denoted intercity-, interstate-, 
or Jong-distance-carriers).179
b. Classification by Type o f Contract
A common carrier is any carrier engaged in the interstate transportation 
of persons/property on a regular schedule at published rates, and whose
178 Welty, 1997.
179 Executive Office of the President Office of Management and Budget, 1987.
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services are available to the general public on a for-hire basis.180 A contract 
carrier is any carrier engaged in the interstate transportation of persons/property 
by motor vehicle on a for-hire basis, but under continuing contract with a limited 
number of customers to meet specific needs of each customer.181 A private 
carrier is any carrier that provides transportation service to the firm that owns or 
leases the vehicle and does not charge a fee.182
c. Classification by Commodity Carried
The ICC had divided the intercity trucking industry (SIC 4213) into 
seventeen commodity divisions, including general freight183 (50.0% of all 
carriers), tank truck (9.4%), bulk commodities (7.8%), refrigerated commodities 
(6.6%), household goods (6.0%), motor vehicles (1.7%), and other specialized 
commodities or other commodities not elsewhere classified (18.5%).184
d. Classification by Shipment Size
Intercity earners of general freight are further classified either into LTL 
(less-than-truckload) carriers or TL (truckload) carriers. TL carriers transport
180 Muller, 1995, p. 255.
181 Muller, 1995, p. 256.
182 Muller, 1995, p. 267.
183 nonbulk.
184 American Trucking Associations, 1993.
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shipments not less than a truckload (10,000 pounds) while LTL carriers transport 
shipments of less than a truckload.185 In 1993, 40.2% of all ICC-regulated 
intercity carriers of general freight were TL carriers and 9.8% were LTL 
carriers.186
e. Classification by Annual Gross Revenue
The ICC has classified motor carriers by their annual gross revenue into 
Class I, Class II, and Class III carriers.187
2. The M otor Carrier A ct o f 1980
In the same year the Staggers Act deregulated the railroads also the 
trucking industry was deregulated through the Motor Carrier Act of 1980.
The main provisions of the Motor Carrier Act were:188
■ Entry into the trucking industry was encouraged by placing the “burden of 
proof on existing carriers that additional service was not needed.
■ Removal of operational restrictions former entrants had submitted to voluntary 
in order to overcome opposition on part of incumbents (like types of goods not 
carried, routes and interchanges not used, etc.).
185 U.S. Census Bureau, 1995, p. B-3.
186 American Trucking Associations, 1993.
187 Muller, 1995, p. 254. In 1995, the Class I threshold was $10 million, Class II threshold was $3 - 
$10 million, and Class III threshold was below $3 million.
188 Wood, 1990, p. 100.
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■ Removal of restrictions on the number of customers with whom each contract 
motor carrier can contract.
■ A “zone of reasonableness” was introduced into motor common carrier rates. 
A carrier may charge rates within a range of plus minus 10 percent a year 
without regulatory approval.
■ The influence of common carrier rate bureaus was reduced.
■ Use of trucks by domestic airlines to pick up or deliver freight that is carried by 
air was facilitated.
Among these provisions freedom of entry was the most important factor. 
Its effects were obvious immediately after deregulation of the motor carrier 
industry. In 1980, there were 18,000 motor carriers holding ICC licenses 
(intercity carriers), in 1986, there were 37.000189, and in 1992 there were 
49,000.190 The total number of carriers is even higher. In 1997, the number of 
trucking establishments totaled 122,190.191
189 Winston, 1990, p. 11.
190 Teske, 1995, p. 71.
191 Dun & Bradstreet, 1997, p. 15. The number is the summation of 67,669 establishments in 
Local Trucking without Storage (SIC 4212), 8,177 establishments in Local Trucking with Storage 
(SIC 4214), and 46,314 establishments in Trucking, except Local (SIC 4213). In 1992, the 
numbers were as follows: Local Trucking without Storage: 49,870; Trucking, except Local: 
40,821; Local Trucking with Storage: 4,512. Total was 95,203 (U.S. Census Bureau, 1996, Table 
No. 1024, p. 635). in 1977, the total number of establishments was 58,335 (U.S. Census Bureau, 
1982, Table No. 1084, p. 624).
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3. Economics of Size and Concentration in the Trucking Industry
The increase in entry into the trucking industry after deregulation suggests 
that there are no economics of size in the trucking industry. Classical barriers to 
entry appear to be absent: Capital requirements are low, and investment 
involves no sunk costs. Hence, the trucking industry appears to be potentially 
atomistic and approaching perfect competition. This is partly true for the truck­
load (TL) sector. Both legal and economic barriers into the truck-load (TL) sector 
are relatively low. The large number of TL businesses operated as sole 
proprietorship supports this assumption.192 However, a large number of trucks 
and scheduled routes bring about an enhanced backhaul ability, and a large 
number of drivers stationed across the nation and sophisticated computer 
systems bring about shorter transit time. Therefore, there are potential 
economics of size in the TL sector, which however do not constitute barriers to 
entry. The less-than-truck-load (LTL) sector is quite different. To offer 
comprehensive nationwide LTL service, a network of at least 300 terminals is 
needed in order to provide competitive service.193 LTL carriers collect, sort, 
consolidate, transport, and distribute shipments through a network of terminals 
organized on the hub- and-spoke principle. The LTL business process requires 
different equipment for each stage. Hence, in the LTL business there are distinct
192 Glaskowsky, 1986, p. 25.
193 Glaskowsky, 1986, p. 5.
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economics of size that prevent entry although legal barriers of entry had been 
removed by deregulation. Since deregulation, virtually no new carriers have 
entered the LTL freight industry and survived.194
Figure 26 on page 99 depicts the concentration of the top two hundred 
motor carriers in 1995, split up into TL and LTL sectors. It can be seen that 6 
LTL carriers account for 50% of the revenues of the top 55 LTL carriers and that 
16 TL carriers account for 50% of the revenues of the 74 top TL carriers.
Although no data are available on each individual firm in the interstate 
trucking industry, the allover relation of number of establishments and total 
revenue indicates the dimension of concentration: There are about 120,000 
firms195 in the industry with total revenue of about $90 billion.196 The 129 firms 
graphed in Figure-26 on page 99 account for $30 billion of revenue out of the 
industry total of $90 billion. The large number of small firms suggests that 
barriers to entry into the are trucking industry (at least TL) are low. Nevertheless, 
the industry is dominated by large firms.
194 Interstate Commerce Commission, 1992, pp. 36-40.
195 See Footnote 191 on page 96.
196 U.S. Census Bureau, 1996, p. 636, Table 1027. This number is not broken down into TL, LTL, 
and “others”. See Footnote 197 on page 98.
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Figure 26: Top 200 Motor Carriers: Industry Concentration, 1995.197
Figure 27 on page 100 depicts the HHIs of the TL and LTL carriers 
graphed in Figure 26 on page 99 . Although below the critical level of 1,000, the 
HHI for the LTL sector is more than 10 times higher than the HHI for the TL 
sector. Roberts argued that separating carriers by the markets in which they
197 Data from American Trucking Associations, 1995. The data is based on 1995 revenues. The 
various categories these carriers were classified into by type of goods carried were consolidated 
into three classes: LTL, package/courier/expediated, and household goods were consolidated into 
LTL, TL and bulk/tank trailers were consolidated into TL, and all other were consolidated into
100
compete reveals even higher concentration. For example, transcontinental 
carriers were defined as carriers with average hauls over 1,000 miles, there were 
only six transcontinental LTL carriers giving the market a HHI of 2357.198
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Figure 27: Top 200 Motor Carriers: HHI, 1995.1"  LTL = less-than-truck-load; TL = truck-load.
others which has been excluded. UPS which is number one and accounts for 26.6% of revenues 
of the top 2 0 0  motor carriers has been excluded.
198 Roberts, 1992.
199 See Footnote 197 on page 96.
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In this chapter, the main developments in the railroad industry that have 
occurred after deregulation were examined. These are continuing firm 
concentration and streamlining of operations. Also the trucking industry and its 
development after deregulation were introduced. In chapter V, intermodal 
transportation, a form of transportation that has become most significant after 
deregulation, is introduced. Secondly, the railroad market is segmented and 
particular segments are analyzed for contestability.
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CHAPTER V.
THE U.S. RAILROAD INDUSTRY IN THE 1990s
A. Intermodal Transportation
1. The Economics of Intermodal Transportation
Intermodal freight transport is a logistically linked movement of freight 
using two or more modes of transport. The idea of intermodality is to capitalize 
on mode specific advantages that are mutually exclusive in single mode 
transportation, mostly universal service availability versus low costs perton-mile. 
Potential gains from intermodality are twofold. First, intermodality can provide 
shippers who are not immediately served by a low-cost carrier with access to a 
low-cost carrier via an intermediate high-cost carrier.200 Second, the low-cost 
carrier, usually specialized in uninterrupted long-haul, is able to reduce the 
number of stops since freight is consolidated by high-cost carriers. That is, take 
advantage of the average length of haul, which is a key determinant of 
profitability for railroads (see Figure 20 on page 84).
200 Although low cost carrier service might be available at the location of a shipper, the shipper 
might not meet the minimum volume requirements. Therefore, shipments need to be consolidated 
by a high cost carrier.
103
Depending on the type of freight carried specific combinations of modes 
are favorable in practice. Table VI on page 103 depicts three different 
combinations. A railroad is a low cost carrier compared to a truck, but a high- 
cost carrier in comparison to a barge. The combination truck-railroad for 
container traffic is the most common combination followed by barge-railroad for 
non-liquid bulk material. Intermodal railroad-truck service, combines the door-to- 
door service of trucks with the high-volume, long-haul economies of railroads. In 
intermodal railroad-truck service the primary types of equipment involved are 
containers or truck trailers which are carried on railroad cars. The combination 
truck-railroad-ocean vessel is most common in overseas container traffic.
Containerized commodities Truck, Railroad, Barge
Solid bulk material/grain Railroad, Barge
Liquid bulk material Pipeline, Barge, Railroad
Table VI: Economical Intermodal Combinations Of Carriers, Modes Ranked By Carrier Cost Per 
Ton-Mile.
Intermodal transport is organized in accordance with a hub-and spoke 
system. Figure 29 on page 104 presents a generic hub-and-spoke topology to 
be carried from A 1 to A2. A commodity is first carried the distance ABi from A1
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into hub 1 on a high-cost mode and then transshipped onto the low-cost carrier. 
The low-cost carrier moves the commodity over the distance CE from hub 1 into 
hub 2, where the commodity is again transshipped to another high-cost carrier 
that moves it the distance BA2 into A2.
Ai
ABi
CE
Figure 29: Generic Hub-And-Spoke Topology.
Figure 30 on page 105 shows the corresponding cost structure, which is 
the basic cost structure inherent in any hub-and-spoke system. AF represents 
the total cost curve of the high-cost carrier (spoke), indicated by a steeper slope 
of the cost curve, while CE represents the total cost curve of the low-cost carrier 
(inter-hub connection) which is not directly available for the shipper. The 
difference Pc - pB represents the cost of transshipment (hub) which equal the
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costs associated with unloading the high-cost carrier and loading the low-cot 
carrier. In the context of Figure 30 on page 105, indicated by the dark line 
ABCDE, a good is carried the distance dB at cost pB, transshipped at cost pc - pB, 
and then carried on the low-cost carrier at cost pE - pc. For simplicity, it is 
assumed that the distance dB includes pickup and drayage (dB = AB., + BA2 in 
Figure 29 on page 104) and that pc - pB represent the cost of transshipment at 
both interchanges. Point D represents the break-even point, and 
correspondingly dD is the break-even distance beyond which intermodal traffic 
becomes less costly. In practice, the break-even distance between railroad 
service and truck service is about 500-700 miles.201
total cost
Pf
Pe
Pd
Pc
Pb
c Ib dD
total distance of m ovem ent 
Figure 30: Cost Structure Of Intermodal Transportation.
201 United States General Accounting Office (GAO), 1993, p. 23.
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In the economic analysis of hub-and-spoke systems the transshipment 
facility (hub) and the transshipment process are the key objects. Taking the cost 
structure of the high-cost and the low-cost carriers involved as given, Figure 30 
on page 105 suggests that total costs of the entire movement are solely 
dependent on transshipment costs.202 Hence, the objective is to minimize 
transshipment costs.
There are two different approaches to minimize transshipment costs.
First, it has been empirically confirmed that hub facilities demonstrate size 
economies.203 That is, the larger the hubs are and the lower the number of hubs 
is the more costs are saved. Second, it has been found that transaction costs 
associated with multiple independent ownership of carriers and hubs are much 
higher than the costs of administrative command under uniform ownership.204 
Hence, overall costs are minimized by integrating hub facilities and all carriers 
involved in the transportation chain under uniform administrative command and 
ownership.205
202 This assumption is not completely accurate because average total costs of haul may be a 
function of length of haul. For purpose of this examination, differences are assumed to be inferior 
over the relevant range of output.
203 Allen, 1986, pp. 22-23.
204 Allen, 1986, pp. 26-27.
205 For a broad discussion of the transaction cost approach, see Coase, 1991, p. 18.
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To conclude, as far as railroads are involved, costs of intermodal 
transportation are minimized if:
1. The distance between terminals is rather long.
Freight revenue is based on ton-miles per time. That is, the longer the haul, 
the heavier loaded the train (the more cars), and the shorter any delays are, 
the more revenue the railroad earns.206 A terminal constitutes a stop which 
causes a delay. Moreover, the more terminals there are, the shorter the 
average length of haul and the less average train load between terminals.
2. Terminals are large in size.
Terminal operation demonstrates size economics. Therefore, it is more 
profitable to operate a few large terminals rather than many small terminals. 
This also supports the demand for long hauls in between terminals, and 
heavier loaded trains.
3. Terminals and other modes o f transportation involved are operated under 
uniform administrative command and ownership.
206 This has been found earlier (see section Operations on page 76).
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It has been found that an intermodal entity under uniform ownership can 
provide all services in the transportation chain at lower costs than under 
multiple ownership. That is, an entity under uniform ownership providing all 
different intermodal services has a strictly subadditive cost function and hence 
constitutes a natural monopoly (multiproduct case).207 Consequently, 
intermodal transportation is always a natural monopoly. Since railroads are 
generally the financially strongest firms involved in intermodal transportation, it 
is likely that intermodal entities are put under administrative command and 
ownership of railroads. A survey among chief executives of all Class I 
railroads in 1981 revealed that more than three-fourths of the survey 
respondents indicated that their railroads planned to attempt to expand on an 
intermodal ownership basis during the next five years.208 Trucking was most 
often identified as the likely direction of such expansion. The most important 
benefits offered by further integration of the modes are a broader traffic base 
and improved service through provision of one-stop, door-to-door intermodal 
service.
2. Intermodal Acquisitions
207 See The Natural Monopoly on page 13.
208 Lieb, 1982, p. 74.
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In 1983, the ICC removed the ban on acquisition of commercial trucking 
firms by railroads.209 During the following years several intermodal acquisitions 
took place: In June, 1985, Norfolk Southern Corporation acquired North 
American Van Lines and its subsidiaries.210 Today, North American Van Lines is 
the twelfth largest motor carrier in the U.S.211 In October, 1996, Union Pacific 
Corporation acquired the Overnite Transportation Company.212 Today, Overnite 
Transportation Company is the tenth largest motor carrier (LTL) in the U.S.213
In 1983, CSX Corporation acquired American Commercial Barge Lines, 
the nation's largest barge line with between 6% and 7% of the inland waterway 
transportation market. It was the first time a railroad had been allowed to 
purchase a barge line since the Panama Canal Act of 1912 forbade railroads 
from owning water carriers.214 In September 1986, CSX Corporation acquired 
Sea-Land Service, Inc., one of the nation's largest ocean carriers.215 In 1987, 
CSX integrated Sea-Land Service’s trucking subsidiaries into its new intermodal 
unit, CSX Intermodal, Inc.216 In 1988, CSX acquired a majority interest in Yukon 
Pacific Corp., an Alaska based corporation that is promoting the construction of a
209 New York Times, 01/07/83.
210 Moody, 1996, p. 76.
211 American Trucking Associations, p. 2.
212 Moody, 1996, p. 110. •
213 American Trucking Associations, 1995, p. 1.
214 Industry Week, 08/06/84.
215 Moody, 1996, p. 421.
216 Abruzzese, 1987.
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Trans-Alaska-Gas System to export North Slope natural gas to Pacific Rim 
countries.217
In 1987, the Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit, rescinded the 
ICC’s 1983 rule which eased acquisition of trucking firms by railroads. This 
litigation sprang from Burlington Northern’s attempt to acquire six trucking 
companies at the same time.218 In 1994, Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe 
Railway (now merged into Burlington Northern Santa Fe Corporation) reached 
an agreement for joint intermodal operations with Yellow Freight System, Inc. (a 
LTL carrier), the nation’s second largest motor carrier after UPS (see Footnote 
197 on page 98).219 Table VII on page 111 depicts today’s intermodal 
subsidiaries of Class I railroads.
Although the ease of national intermodal acquisitions has been stemmed, 
it continues internationally. In June 1996, CSX, NS Cargo (the Netherlands’ rail 
freight operator), and Germany's Deutsche Bahn (DB) announced that they have 
signed a letter of intent to jointly create a company called NDX Intermodal. The 
new company will provide freight service for the movement of containers, trailers 
and swap body freight throughout Europe.220
217 Moody, 1996, p. 421.
218 Regular Common Carrier Conference v. U.S., 820 F.2d 1323 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
219 Klaus, 1994.
220 Hill, 1996.
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Conrail Merchants Dispatch Transp. Co. Fixed Facilities and Inspection and 
Weighing Services for Motor Vehicle
4785
Norfolk
Southern
Lambert's Point Barge Company, Inc. Water Transportation of Freight, nec 4449
Lambert's Point Docks, Inc. Marine Cargo Handling 4491
Airforce Pipeline Inc. Refined Petroleum Pipelines 4613
NS Transportation Brokerage 
Corporation
Arrangement of Transportation of 
Freight and Cargo
4731
Southern Region Motor Transport, 
Inc.
Trucking, Except Local 4213
North American Van Lines, Inc. Trucking, Except Local. 4213
CSX American Commercial Lines Inc. Water Transportation of Freight, nec 4449
Ship Building and Repairing 3731
CSX Intermodal, Inc. Railroads, Line-Haul Operating 4011
Deep Sea Foreign Transportation of 
Freight
4412
Water Transportation of Freight, nec 4449
Sea-Land Service, Inc. Deep Sea Foreign Transportation of 
Freight
4412
Yukon Pacific Corp. (Pipeline)
Kansas
City
Southern
Landa Motor Lines Trucking, Except Local 4213
UP PMT of the Southwest, Inc. Trucking, Except Local 4213
Southern Illinois and Missouri Bridge 
Co.
Transportation Services, nec 4789
The Ogden Union Railway and Depot 
Co.
Transportation Services, nec 4789
Overnite Transportation Co. Trucking, Except Local 4213
General Warehousing and Storage 4225
Pacific Motor Transport Co. Trucking, Except Local 4213
Pacific Motor Trucking Co. Trucking, Except Local 4213
Southern Pacific Warehouse Co. General Warehousing and Storage 4225
Table VII: Class I Railroads: Intermodal Subsidiaries, 1997.221
221 National Register Publishing Company, 1997.
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3. The Intermodal Business (Rail-Truck)
Today’s intermodal service has arisen during the last 20 years. Between 
1980 and 1995, the number of intermodal units loaded by United States railroads 
increased from 3.0 million units to 8.1 million units, or more than 250% (see 
Figure 31 on page 1 13).222 Accordingly, intermodal service has become a very 
important source of revenue for railroads. In 1994, intermodal traffic generated 
approximately 15 percent of total revenues of railroads, making it the second 
most important revenue source.223 Generally, only high value commodities (non­
bulk) are shipped in intermodal units. This is remarkable insofar as high value 
goods traditionally are not shipped by railroad because railroad transportation 
traditionally was seen to be less reliable and damage rates were high.
222 Intermodal units are trailers, ajso denoted TOFC (trailer-on-flatcar) or “piggyback”, and 
containers, also denoted C.O.F.C. (container-on-flatcar, known as “double-stack train”).
223 Muller, 1995, p. 29.
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Figure 31: Class I Railroads: Intermodal Traffic, 1965 - 1995.224
Despite the rapid growth since 1980, intermodal traffic still accounts for 
only a small share of the total intercity freight traffic in the U.S., about 6 
percent.225 It is estimated that 25% of the intercity trucking market is susceptible 
to competition between intermodal rail service and truckload companies, which is 
the share of interstate trucking freight hauled over more than 500 miles.226
224 Railroad Facts, 1996, p. 26.
225 Railroad Facts, 1996, p. 26.
226 United States General Accounting Office (GAO), 1993, p. 24.
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Generally, railroads act as wholesalers in selling intermodal service, while 
third parties act as retailers and consolidators of small shipments.227 Rail 
contracts now offer rate structures that induce container traffic consolidation into 
larger trains, denser routes, fewer origin and destination points, and fewer 
ports.228
In 1984, container and trailer traffic was exempted from regulation. The 
Shipping Act of 1984 introduced greater flexibility in the use of service contracts 
for the ocean shipping and intermodal movement of containers. In 1991, 
Congress passed the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act which 
aims at developing a nationwide intermodal transportation system. It 
encourages intermodal connectivity (i.e., agreements among carriers of different 
modes), providing legislative and financial incentives of $155 billion in the fiscal 
years 1992-1997.229
Although the intermodal business has been growing, the number of 
terminals has been declining. In 1975 there were 1,500 intermodal terminals in 
the U.S., compared to 230 in 1990.230 The reduction in the number of terminals 
can be explained in two ways. First, it is a direct consequence of the
227 Those are Shippers’ Agents now denoted Intermodal Marketing Companies (IMC), Shippers’ 
Associations, and Freight Forwarders.
228 MacDonald, 1996.
229 Muller, 1995, p. 27.
115
concentration of Class I railroads which made “doubled facilities” obsolete. 
Second, the cost structure of railroad operation calls for concentration of 
terminals per se. Computerized logistics via EDI have become a core 
component of intermodal service, calling for further centralization and 
concentration.
B. Is the Railroad Monopoly Contestable?
In the 19th century, the railroads had been the only means of 
transportation. In 1887, a rationale for railroad regulation had been to protect 
shippers from abuse of monopoly power of the railroads. In 1980, a rationale for 
deregulating the railroads was that the impact of railroads on the surface 
transportation system of the U.S. had been dwindling and hence there was no 
threat of abuse of monopoly power on part of the railroads any more. The 
railroad industry was not said to be competitive, but since there were alternatives 
to railroad service in most cases, railroad service was seen to be contestable.23'
Since the deregulation in 1980, the railroad industry has undergone some 
significant structural changes. In particular, the railroads have improved their 
efficiency by 350%, the concentration of Class I railroads has taken on levels far
230 United States General Accounting Office (GAO), 1993, p. 22.
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above the “critical level”, and railroads have acquired leading firms of different 
modes of transportation. Therefore, in this section of the study, it is examined 
whether the railroad industry can said to be contestable today.
1. Defining The Relevant Market
The degree of market power, competition, and contestability can only be 
measured for a relevant market. That is, the entire market needs to be 
segmented by (1) product and by (2) geographic area for further examinations.
a. Product
In the railroad industry “product” means movement of a particular 
commodity. Figure 19 on page 83 depicts all major types of commodities carried 
by railroads. For the following examinations those are consolidated into four 
major groups (see Table VIII on page 118). Those are “intermodal” (index “I”), 
“liquid bulk material” (index “L”), “solid bulk material” (index “S”), and “farm 
products” (index “F”), where each of them constitutes a separate product market. 
Each product market p is assigned a “degree of potential contestability” Cp 
based on consideration by which modes each commodity group can be shipped 
economically. “Economical” in this context means that the rate for transportation
231 See The Staggers Rail Act of 1980 on page 48.
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of a unit of a particular commodity by a certain mode does not exceed a 
prohibitive threshold which would disallow transportation of that particular 
commodity by that mode in practice. However, even though there may be 
several economical modes of transportation for each particular commodity, there 
may be considerable rate differentials among these modes. The more 
competitive in their primary markets the modes of transportation being 
economical for a particular commodity are, and the more alternative modes of 
transportation are economical for a particular commodity, the more potentially 
contestable that particular product market is.
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Containerized
goods
(intermodal)
(C, = 4)
Containers can be economically shipped by barge, railroad, 
and truck (TL). Although trucking is the least economical 
mode of transportation, trucking is most economical for 
containerized goods (high-value goods). The TL industry is 
competitive because entry is free (i.e., it is most likely that 
every shipper has the opportunity to ship containers by truck 
alternatively to railroad or barge) and trucks are not locally 
bound.232
Liquid bulk 
material (“oil”)
CL = 3
Liquid bulk materials can be economically shipped by 
pipeline, barge, and railroad. There are two alternatives if 
one mode drops out. However, all three alternatives are 
locally bound and hence possibly not actually available at any 
particular location.
Solid bulk 
material
Cs = 2
Solid bulk materials can be economically shipped by barge, 
and railroad. There is only one alternative if one mode drops 
out. However, both alternatives are locally bound and hence 
possibly not actually available at any particular location.
Farm products 
(“grain”)
CF = 1
Farm products can be economically shipped by barge, and 
railroad. There is only one alternative if one mode drops out. 
However, both alternatives are locally bound and hence 
possibly not actually available at any particular location. 
Further, shipper’s bargaining power is rather low (there is a 
large number of small shippers) and the business is seasonal 
which may cause reluctance on part of carriers to make 
commitments in equipment and other capacity.
Table VIII: Commodities (Product Markets) Ranked By And Their Degree Of Potential 
Contestability Cp.233
232 See Economics of Size and Concentration in the Trucking Industry on page 97.
233 “4” = most contestable. See also Table VI on page 103.
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For formal purposes, the entries in Table VIII on page 118 can be 
rewritten as matrix E (matrix of economical modes of transportation in particular
product markets), where an entry Epm = 1 indicates that mode m is an 
economical mode of transportation in product market p and Epm = 0 indicates that 
mode m is not an economical mode of transportation in product market p.
Modes of transportation are indexed R = “railroad”, M = “motor carrier”, B = 
“barge”, P = “pipeline”.
"1 1 1 0"
Ejr Ejp 1 0 1 1
' * 1 0 1 0
_^ FR Efp _ 1 0 1 0
Vector C contains the degree of potential contestability Cp of each 
product market p,
“C / "4"
Q 3c  = L —
Cs 2
CF 1_
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b. Geographic Area
Table IX on page 120 shows the relative density of transportation modes 
in selected regions Rg of the United States.
(1) East of Missouri River 2 3 1 2
(2) West of Missouri River 1 1 0 1
(3) Official Territory 3 4 3 3
(4) Gulf Coast 3 2 2 4
(5) Ohio River region 4 4 3 4
Table IX: United States: Relative density of transportation modes Agm 234
Table IX on page 120 accounts for the relative (with respect to other 
geographic regions) density of transportation modes and hence for the general 
availability of modes of transportation in particular regions. It does not account 
for ownership diversity. That is, although a particular region may exhibit a high 
density of a particular mode, competition in that mode does not need to be high 
accordingly.
234 _ dense; “3" = medium; "2" = sparse; “1” = fairly sparse, “0” = none. Railroad: See Table IV
on page 72; Highway. Wood, 1990, p. 95; Waterway Wood, 1990, p. 182; Oil Pipeline: Wood, 
1990, p. 151.
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For formal purposes, the entries information in Table IX on page 120 can 
be rewritten as matrix A (matrix of availability of modes of transportation m in
geographic markets g), where an entry Agm indicates to what relative extend 
mode m is available in a geographic market g
A =
L1R
l 5 R
"2 3 1 2
A]p 1 1 0 1
I = 3 4 3 3
Asp _ 3 2 2 4
4 4 3 4
2. The Relevant Markets
To determine the degree of potential contestability of each product market 
in each geographic region, the cumulated availability of all modes for each 
commodity group in each geographic region is determinated and then multiplied 
by the degree of potential contestability of each product market.
Matrix C contains the degree of potential contestability of each product 
market in each geographic region.
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C =
Cl XX(£lmxAlm)
m
Cp x ^ , ( E rm x Alm)
m
C f X X A5m)
which yields C =
24 15 6 3
8 6 2 1
40 21 12 6
28 21 10 5
44 33 14 7
The entries of matrix C are reproduced in Table X on page 123. The
numbers given in Table X on page 123 are not cardinal, do not reflect cost 
differentials among modes, and do not reflect ownership diversity. Nevertheless, 
Table X on page 123 indicates to what (relative) extend different physical means 
for economical transportation for particular commodity groups (product markets) 
are available in particular regions of the U.S. (geographic markets), which is 
proportional to the degree of potential contestability of certain (product and 
geographic) transportation markets. Accordingly, intermodal transportation in the 
Ohio River region appears to be most potentially contestable, while shipping 
farm products West of the Missouri River seems to be least contestable.
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East of Missouri River 24 15 6 3
West of Missouri River 8 6 2 1
Official Territory 40 21 12 6
Gulf Coast 28 21 10 5
Ohio River region 44 33 14 7
Table X: Degree Of Potential Contestability In Particular Transportation Markets.235 The extremum 
values are bolded.
However, Table X on page 123 does not account for shipments in 
between markets. This fact is of particular importance insofar as the break even 
distance beyond which railroad service becomes an economical alternative in 
intermodal transportation is at 500 miles or more.236 That is, to really capitalize 
on the potentially contestable environment in the Ohio River region, commodities 
must be shipped over at least 500 miles. A circle with a radius of 500 miles
235 The numbers in Table VIII and Table IX are ordinal, so they do not bear any weight with 
respect to each other and hence cannot be a base for the cardinal numbers in Table X. Adding up 
relative mode availability of particular transportation modes economical for transportation of 
particular commodity groups implies a linear relation which may not reflect reality. The 
multiplicative correlation of the cumulated mode availability of particular transportation modes 
economical for transportation of particular commodity groups and the degree of potential 
contestability of particular product markets may also not reflect reality. However, since the only 
purpose of Table X is to identify minimum and maximum, the calculation method applied is 
sufficiently accurate.
236 The break even distance for truck-barge and rail-barge is even longer considering the fact that 
barge transportation is a low cost mode compared to railroad transportation.
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around the Ohio River region intersects Minneapolis, Kansas City, Arkansas, 
Alabama, and the North Atlantic Coast.
Table XI on page 124 indicates that barge service alternative to railroad 
service exists only to three of the five destinations, namely the North Atlantic 
Coast, the Gulf Coast, and to Minneapolis/St. Paul. However, the upper 
Mississippi River System is closed to barge traffic during the winter months. 
Thus, Minneapolis/St. Paul does not have barge service over one-third of the 
year.237
North A tlantic Coast 3 Railroads (Conrail, CSX, NFS), Barge
Gulf Coast 1 Railroad (IC), Barge
Minneapolis/St. Paul 1 Railroad (Soo), Barge
Southeast 2 Railroads (CSX, NFS)
West of Missouri River 2 Railroads (via interchange)
Table XI: Available Modes For Freight Transport (Other Than Truck) Out Of The Ohio River 
Region Into Destinations More Than 500 Miles Away.
237 Kocemba, 1995.
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The North Atlantic Coast and the Ohio River region are linked through 
three Class I railroads, an inland waterway, and a dense interstate highway 
network. Hence, intermodal transportation between these two regions appears 
to be most contestable.
As shown in Table X on page 123, transportation of farm products out of 
the Region West of the Missouri River appears to be least contestable. The 
most remote region west of the Missouri River that is exporting farm products at 
large scale, is the State of North Dakota. Therefore, for the following 
examinations, the study will concentrate on North Dakota as potentially least 
contestable region of the U.S. If this market, which is least likely to be 
contestable, is still sufficiently contestable, then deregulation is clearly justifies in 
all markets.
3. The Local Market
The central statement of the contestable market theory is that the threat of 
potential entry makes a monopolist behave like a firm under perfect competition, 
hence, to set its price equal to average total cost. Otherwise, a potential 
competitor would enter the market and serve the incumbent’s demand. If the 
incumbent matches the price, the entrant would withdraw by fully recovering his 
outlays.
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Figure 32 on page 127 illustrates a typical local scenario. Terminal A of 
Railroad A (charging rate rA for the movement of a container over a distance x) is 
located in the immediate environs of shipper S’ location. In the broader environs 
there are Terminal B of Barge Line B and Terminal C of a competing Railroad C 
(charging rate rc for the movement of a container over the same distance x). 
ATCa are assumed to equal ATCc while rA > rc. Trucking service is available 
everywhere where CT{y} is the uniform linear rate charged by the trucking 
service for moving a container over the distance y.
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Barge B Railroad C
Railroad A
road
Figure 32: Contestability At The Local Level.
To ship a container on Railroad A (or to receive the container from A), the 
container must be trucked over the distance SaA at costs CT {SaA}. To ship the 
same container on Railroad C (or to receive the container from C), the container 
must be trucked over the distance SadeC at costs CT{SadeC}, where 
CT{SadeC} > CT{SaA}. As long as [rA + CT{SaA}] < [rc + CT{SadeC}], it is still 
more profitable for S to ship on Railroad A although rA > rc. Although Railroad A 
is making excess profit ([rA - ATCa] > [rc - ATCc]), Railroad C would not move its 
Terminal C closer to S because this would involve transaction costs and Railroad
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C would also forgo revenues from other shippers incurring higher trucking costs 
after the shift. Just as much, Railroad C would not erect a second terminal close 
to S because of operating costs involved that would exceed marginal profits from 
S. Principally, railroads are even inclined to reduce the number of terminals.238 
Railroad C might lower its rate rc to attract S, but then Railroad A would respond 
with a rate cut and both railroads would end up sacrificing profits (predatory 
pricing).
The same principle applies for shipments on Barge Line B. Also, as 
depicted in Figure 32 on page 127, Barge Line B cannot interchange containers 
with Railroad A at all, and vice versa. By locating terminals distant from 
waterways, railroads avoid to interchange traffic with barge lines. This enables 
the railroad to provide the entire haul on its own, which generates more ton-miles 
at constant loading/unloading costs. Railroads have been accused pursuing this 
strategy.239
If the local market depicted in Figure 32 on page 127 was perfectly 
contestable, then Railroad C or any other entrepreneur would immediately erect 
a terminal at point c (as Barge Line B would do at point b), set rc slightly below 
rA, serve S, and earn excess profit of rc - ATCc. Railroad A would not
238 See The Intermodal Business (Rail-Truck) on page 112.
129
immediately react by matching or undercutting rc (Bertrand-Nash-Conjecture). 
However, it has been shown that all this is not going to happen. Consequently, a 
market with properties like that depicted in Figure 32 on page 127 is not perfectly 
contestable.
On the other hand, the market is not purely monopolistic. Since a 
container can be physically shipped on a truck, the availability of trucking service 
keeps the railroad rate difference ArAC = (rA - rc) within certain boundaries (Ar < CT 
{SadeC} - CT{SaA}). Hence, trucking service is to some extent a substitute for 
rail service because its availability influences rail rates. However, it is not a 
perfect substitute because the cost of shipping a container by truck exceeds cost 
of shipping a container by rail and therefore allow for the rail rate difference ArAC 
to be sustainable. Hence, the rate differential o f two modes 5rHL = (rH - rL) is a 
measure of their economical substitutability which is proportional to the 
contestability of their common market, provided physical substitutability is 
feasible. The degree of contestability can be expressed by the coefficient240
C = \ - rH~h,  = Ik. (<!)
r„ r„
239 Muller, 1995, p. 35.
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where rH is the rate of the high-cost carrier (short-haul) which is 
competitive in its primary market and rL is the rate of the low-cost (long-haul) 
carrier exhibiting monopolistic behavior. Perfect contestability would be 
achieved where C = 1 while C = 0 would constitute a case of a pure monopoly. In 
contrast, the sustainable rate difference among monopolistic carriers ArAC is 
solely a function of a difference in the costs of the short-hauls, which is a function 
of in the distances shipper-terminal at a given high-cost carrier rate 
CT{y}- *n context of Figure 32 on page 127, sustainable rate difference 
among monopolistic carriers is241
240 Substitutability of products, which a proportional to contestability in this case, can also 
measured by their cross-price-elasticity.
241 The preceding assumption is somewhat simplistic since the shipper assumes both long-haul 
rates, rA and rC) to be based on the same long-haul distance x, which is realistic when approached 
from the non-contestable edge because in the non-contestable case the long-haul rate per ton- 
mile is per definition lower than the short-haul rate perton-mile (Equation 1). That is, differences 
in the long-haul length among both long-haul carriers cause only negligible differences in the total 
long-haul charge. Starting the train of thought from the edge of perfect contestability (C = 1 r 
{x} = CT {y}) requires to be more specific: Assume the shortest distance between shipper and final 
destination (as he crow flies, approximated by road distance) is z which can be broken down into 
a distance shipper-terminal (y) and a long-haul (x),
where z < y + x. With [Equation (1)] rA{x} can be rewritten as C*CT {xA} , where xA is the long-
haul distance Railroad A uses as basis for the long-haul rate. The shipper perceives no difference 
between alternatives A and C if the total costs he will incur are equal:
C*CT*xA + CT* y A =  C*CT*xc + CT*yc (a)
<=> CT*(C *xA + y A) = CT*(C*xc + y c) (b)
where C j is a rate equal to average total cost set under perfect competition (remember: It was 
assumed that the short-haul carrier is perfectly competitive in its primary market and that 
contestability means perfect economical substitutability of the modes, which means that the 
conditions of the short-haul carrier’s market [perfect competition] become the conditions of the 
common market). C is set by external conditions that govern the rate differential of two modes 5rHL 
= (rH - rL) of the two modes [Equation (1)]. According to [Equation (b)], in the perfect contestable 
case that combination of segments of haul [(i) Railroad A + short haul yA, or (ii) Railroad C + short 
haul yc, or (iii) the entire haul (z) by truck] with the shortest total length is the most favorable one, 
which is truck. The less contestable the market is, the more favorable that combination that has 
the largest portion of the total haul hauled by the long-haul mode (rail) becomes (i.e., the lower
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^ rAC — rA ■ rC CT{yC} ■ (2)
That is, in determining the terms at which intermodal service is available to 
shippers, the location of transshipment facilities is extremely important because 
the terms of intermodal service heavily depend on the distances between the 
customer and the transshipment facilities. As the distance increases, the transit 
time and hence the cost of intermodal service increases because more high-cost 
carrier service is taken up, which increases the rates competing long-haul 
providers may charge without loosing business.
Generally, the findings suggest that the concept of perfect contestability 
does not hold in a local multi-mode transportation market. In terms of [Equation 
(1)], perfect contestability among modes means equal rates per unit of 
production. Equal rates generally imply equal costs, which in the case of rail and 
truck is most unlikely to be correct. From that point, there can never be any 
perfect contestability among railroad and truck. The ratio cost covering rail rate
rates the railroad could theoretically charge. However, if there is a gap between the rate a railroad 
could theoretically charge and the second lowest bid, the railroad may fill that gap through excess 
profit) This finding is immediately comprehensible and is consistent with the finding from the non­
contestable edge. The finding also is consistent with [Equation (1)] if [Equation (1)] is approached 
mathematically: Perfect contestability among modes means nothing but physically equal costs per 
unit of production, which can, with respect to rail and truck, nerver be the case. From that point, 
there can never be perfect contestability among rail and truck. Moreover, at least in a local
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per ton-mile over cost covering truck rate per ton-mile, in conjunction with 
differences in the distance shipper-terminal, has an impact on rail rates, but 
unless this ratio is equal to one, which is not realistic, railroads do have a cost 
advantage over trucks allowing for excess profits.
4. Particular Markets
a. Intermodal Container Transportation between the Ohio River 
Region and the North Atlantic Coast Region
In section B.2. of this chapter, intermodal container transportation 
between the Ohio River region and the North Atlantic Coast region was identified 
to be most likely to be contestable. In intermodal container transportation, the 
high-cost carrier service can be provided either by the same ownership entity 
that provides the long haul or by an independent firm. The first case constitutes 
a natural monopoly (see section A.1. of this chapter) which is, compared to the 
second alternative, less likely to be contestable. If independent firms provide the 
short-haul, there is a potential for vigorous competition among high-cost carriers 
for the haul over the distance shipper-transshipment facility. In section B.3. of 
this chapter the foundations for contestability at the level of the shipper were 
developed. For a transportation market to be perfectly contestable, the rate
setting, a railroad has always an advantage compared to trucking firms (see findings from
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differentials of railroad service and trucking service at the originating market and 
at the destination markets have to be equal to zero, which is quite unlikely to be 
the case in reality. Consequently, the market at issue is not perfectly 
contestable.
On the other hand, in both the Ohio River region and in the North Atlantic 
Coast region there are numerous independent trucking firms providing potential 
competitive transportation services between hub facilities and customers. Thus, 
it is likely that there is a competitive finite trucking rate rH that leads to a 
contestability degree greater than 0 and a monopoly degree of M = (1-C) less 
than 1. Thus, the intermodal container transportation market between the Ohio 
River region and the North Atlantic Coast region shows some contestable 
characteristics but is not perfectly contestable. The bottom line of this market 
structure is that railroads do have a positive advantage, trucking firms do have 
an advantage equal to zero, and shippers have a negative advantage. The 
availability of trucking service, which is competitive in its primary market and 
which is a physical substitute for railroad service, constitutes an upper boundary 
of the railroad’s advantage and a lower boundary on the shipper’s disadvantage.
[Equation (b)]).
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b. Transportation o f Grain out of North Dakota
Table X on page 123 shows that transportation of grain out of North 
Dakota has been identified to be the least potentially contestable market in the 
U.S. There has been evidence that railroad pricing in this market is 
monopolistic.242
North Dakota represents a classic captive market. First, North Dakota is 
served by only two railroads, Burlington Northern and the Soo Line. Second, the 
degree of intermodal competition is limited. Due to the great distances to major 
markets of consumption, processing, and export, such as the Pacific Northwest, 
the East Coast, and the Gulf, trucking is not an economically feasible mode in 
transporting grain out of North Dakota. North Dakota's nearest barge loading 
facility for grain is Minneapolis/St. Paul in Minnesota, over 200 miles from the 
nearest North Dakota city and operational only two-thirds of the year. Hence, 
barge competition is virtually nonexistent. Third, the primary products produced 
in North Dakota are relatively unique to the region so rail rates are not 
constrained much by competition with product substitutes from different regions 
moving at competitive rates.
242 See Koo, 1993. Includes further references. See also Schmitz, 1995.
135
Between 1984 and 1989, over 73 percent of the grain shipments from 
North Dakota moved by rail.243 In 1996, the rate for a grain car trip from 
Bismarck, North Dakota to Minneapolis (400 miles) was $2,300. The rate for a 
grain car trip from Minneapolis to Chicago (also 400 miles), however, was 
$1,000. The only difference between these routes is that the route from 
Bismarck to Minneapolis is a monopoly route while the route from Minneapolis to 
Chicago is not.244 This gives clear evidence that railroads take advantage of 
market power if there is an opportunity to do so.
Railroads defended themselves on charges of abuse by noting that the 
number of complaints against rail rates has been decreasing over the years. In 
the early 1990s, fewer than ten complaints and protests per year were filed with 
the ICC compared with nearly 300 per year before 1980.245 A reason for this 
decline might be that the ICC has been increasing fees for filing rate complaints. 
In 1995, the cost of challenging a single rate under current ICC standards for 
"market dominance" and "rate reasonableness" was about $250,000 - $500,000, 
a prohibitive cost for a small country elevator.246 In 1996, the Surface
243 Koo, 1993.
244 Congressional Press Releases, 1997.
245 U.S. Department of Commerce, 1994.
246 Kocemba, 1995.
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Transportation Board proposed to increase the fees for filing rate complaints by 
23,000 percent, from $1,000 up to $233,000.247
c. Transportation o f Coal - “Bottlenecks”
Transportation of solid bulk material out of the region West of the Missouri 
River has been identified to be the second least potentially contestable market in 
the U.S. (Table X on page 123). Presently, railroads are accused of abusing 
market power in the coal business. A "bottleneck case” is constituted if two or 
more railroads serve the origin point of coal but only one railroad serves the 
destination (usually an electric utility plant). Generally, the competing railroads 
are asking the Surface Transportation Board to require the “bottleneck carrier” to 
offer only a local service, short-haul rate from the closest interchange point to the 
final destination which would enable them to compete on the long-haul and 
interchange cars at the interchange point. Utilities also attempt to challenge the 
reasonableness of the rate over the bottleneck part. In the most recent 
“bottleneck case” which involved Union Pacific, Conrail, the STB ruled against 
the utility, deciding that both the law and precedent made it clear that a shipper 
cannot insist that a “bottleneck railroad” provides only a short-haul service under
247 Schulz, 04/15/96.
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a local rate that could be separately challenged if the carrier also provides origin- 
to-destination service by itself or in conjunction with another railroad.248
C. Is Open-Access a Working Alternative?
Due to cases of abuse of market power on the part of railroads, injured 
parties - mostly farmers, mining firms, and public utilities - have been rising 
claims for greater government participation in the railroad industry.249 In 
particular, proponents of re-regulation promote requiring railroads to open their 
track to competitors for some form of access fee proportional to use. More 
radical minded proponents of re-regulation even suggest government ownership 
of track or ownership of the track by a person prohibited from acting as a carrier.
The argument is that open-access would break up monopoly routes since 
any railroad would have access to any track. In a structural sense, open-access 
means transition from a monopoly to a more competitive stage by stimulating 
entry. Competition among railroads would decrease the probability of earning a 
rent. It also would at least reduce prevalent rate discrimination against product 
and geographic markets (see section B.4. of this chapter on page 132) and
248 Welty, 1997.
249 Edwards, 10/13/96, and Burke, 09/23/96.
138
hence eliminate some major opportunities for cross-subsidizing. In the past, 
competition among railroads lead to destructive competition.250 The ultimate 
cause of destructive competition are high fixed costs of infrastructure (which are 
also sunk costs) that need to be allocated among output. Under open-access 
regulation which would leave ownership of track with the railroads, railroads 
would recover at least a share of fixed costs via access fees. Further, since 
each railroad were likely to take up some track of other railroads for which fees 
had to be paid, these (former fixed costs) were then changed into variable cost. 
Thus open-access, even with ownership of track left with the railroads, would 
reallocate fixed costs as variable costs and hence would take away the base of 
destructive competition. Government ownership of track would fully reallocate 
fixed costs of infrastructure as variable costs as long as fees payable were tight 
to actual demands. In effect, government ownership of railroad infrastructure 
would move the railroad industry closer to conditions under which the trucking 
industry is operating. The trucking industry does not own road infrastructure, 
however, it finances the major share (but less than its engineering share) of the 
interstate highway system via taxes.251
Opposition to open-access comes from the railroads. Railroads claim 
open-access would discourage investment in new equipment and facilities and
250 See Footnote 21 on page 20.
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that it would hurt customer service in the long run.252 Admittedly, the prospect of 
exclusive usage of investments and of a future monopoly rent may be a stronger 
incentive for investing in assets than the prospect of earning a normal profit. 
Moreover, commonly used infrastructure may be an incentive to shirk which 
would lead to deterioration. It can also be argued that only a “rent” may provide 
funds for future investments. On the other hand, the prospect of being a 
monopolist may even not require any improvements at all because shippers will 
have no choice anyway. This argument for open-access is quite credible when 
contemplating the different market segments of railroads and trucking services 
by ranking them by their degree of competition: The North Dakota grain 
transportation market would be located on the monopolistic edge, followed by 
transportation of coal and so on. The most competitive edge would be the truck­
load (TL) trucking market, followed by the less-than- truck-load (LTL) trucking 
service and then followed by intermodal service involving railroads. The 
observation is that the more competitive the market is, the better is the customer 
service perceived by shippers.253 Therefore, open-access is most likely to 
improve railroad service rather than to harm service. The argument that open- 
access will not work technically has been disproved by the fact that Amtrak has 
been operating for more than 25 years almost exclusively under trackage rights 
agreements.
251 United States General Accounting Office (GAO), 1993, p. 12.
140
In sum, open-access appears to be a working alternative to improve 
railroad service through enlivening intramodal competition without bearing the 
drawbacks formerly experienced in connection with railroad competition. 
However, since there are basically only five competing firms in the industry, the 
industry will remain an oligopoly which facilitates collusion and cartelization. 
That is, although open-access would formally establish competition, railroads 
could tacitly enter into mutual agreements not to serve certain markets so that 
each railroad would remain a monopolist in a particular market. A similar 
development has occurred in the deregulated airline industry where each major 
carrier dominates several different hub airports.254
252 Edwards, 10/13/96, and Burke, 09/23/96.
253 See Kocemba, 1995 and United States General Accounting Office (GAO), 1993.
254 Blechschmidt, 1996, p. 50.
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CHAPTER VI. 
CONCLUSIONS
Deregulation has achieved its primary goal. The financial condition of 
railroads has bettered remarkably. Railroads were able to increase their rate of 
return to levels that had never been reached since the late 1920s.255 Increases in 
profitability have been accompanied by dramatic increases in productivity.
In addition, firm concentration of Class I railroads has reached dimensions 
far beyond anti-competitive levels. Only five major railroads remain in the U.S.
All major railroads have acquired different modes of transportation and have 
entered the emerging market for intermodal transportation. Taking the 
characteristics of natural monopolies into account, the trend towards intramodal 
and intermodal concentration is consistent with monopoly price discrimination 
tactics. However, concentration was assumed to not be harmful to competition 
because of the presence of intermodal competition (contestability).
The findings of this study suggest that in general deregulation of railroads 
on the basis of contestable markets is not justified. By definition, the
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(intramodal) railroad transportation market can never be contestable as long as 
railroads own infrastructure because infrastructure constitutes major sunk costs. 
Sunk costs are not allowed in a contestable market.256 Open-access to trackage 
would eliminate sunk costs, the main barrier to entry. The intramodal railroad 
market would be contestable if all significant barriers to entry were abolished and 
if market entry would occur upon any one firm earning an excess profit.
However, even if all barriers to entry were abolished, entry at the local level, 
where competition actually occurs, would not happen. Thus, railroad profitability 
and extensive entry are mutually exclusive.257 With respect to the entire market, 
railroads have an incentive to intentionally refrain from entry into particular 
markets in order to mutually maintain profits. Thus, entry is unlikely to occur 
even in the absence of barriers to entry.258 Cases of exertion of monopoly power. 
in the markets for transportation of grain and coal provide evidence that the 
intramodal railroad transportation market is monopolistic if unregulated.
In intermodal transportation the degree of contestability depends on 
whether or not railroads own other modes of transportation. If railroads own 
other modes of transportation, the entire chain of intermodal transportation is a
255 Previous years have not been taken into account because of differences in accounting 
methods.
256 See The Contestable Market Theory on page 22.
257 See The Local Market on page 125.
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natural monopoly which is not contestable. If railroads do not own other modes 
of transportation, then the intermodal transportation market only can be 
considered to be contestable to the extent to which railroad service is technically 
and economically substitutable and to the extent suitable substitutes are 
available. It has been shown that railroad service is never fully economically 
substitutable by other modes. Therefore, intermodal transportation never can be 
fully contestable. To conclude, there is no railroad market segment that is truly 
contestable and the predictions of the contestable market theory do not hold in 
practice respectively.
In addition to the railroad industry’s recent deregulation, the airline 
industry also has been deregulated recently. In 1978, it was argued the airline 
industry would be highly contestable after deregulation. In 1996, Blechschmidt 
found that the airline industry did not exhibit the characteristics of a contestable 
market after deregulation. Particularly, there are distinct barriers to entry erected 
by incumbents at hub cities that bar entry into the industry and preserve local 
monopolies.259
258 It can be distinguished between entry by existing railroads and entry by new railroads. Entry by 
existing railroads is easier than entry by new railroads. Thus, no entry by existing railroads means 
no entry by new railroads.
259 Blechschmidt, 1996, p. 73.
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The political settings of the 1970s and 1980s give a credible explanation 
why the contestable market theory does not hold in practice.260 When the Bell 
System came under antitrust challenge in 1974, AT&T employed economists, 
who later became known as the Baumol group, at least partly to formulate ideas 
to resist the antitrust suit and later to resist entry into its markets. The 
contestability idea has been taken up by other witnesses representing dominant 
firms other than AT&T. Thus the purpose of the contestable market theory was 
to provide an argument in favor of dominant firms rather than to explain real 
market structures.
If the present merger policy is not changed, then concentration in the 
railroad industry will continue, and the United States will be left with only one or 
two major railroads in the near future. Those railroads will be operating at large 
scale (both in intra- and intermodal transportation) and hence at low average 
total cost, which is a potential benefit for the society. On the other hand, since 
then all competition will have been taken away, those railroads will have the 
ability to fully exploit their monopoly power. Given the non-contestability of the 
railroad monopoly as well as past experience, the latter is likely to happen.
Thus, only a political shift towards more rigid merger guidelines can protect 
society from being at the mercy of the railroads.
260 Shepherd, 1995.
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